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Abstract
To address concerns about time and expense associated with software
aspects of certification, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) began
the Streamlining Software Aspects of Certification (SSAC) program. As part
of this program, a Technical Team was established to determine whether the
cost and time associated with certifying aircraft can be reduced while
maintaining or improving safety, with the intent of impacting the FAA's
Flight 2000 program. The Technical Team conducted a workshop to gain a
better understanding of the major concerns in industry about software cost
and schedule. Over 120 people attended the workshop, including
representatives from the FAA, commercial transport and general aviation
aircraft manufacturers and suppliers, and procurers and developers of non-
airborne systems; and, more than 200 issues about software aspects of
certification were recorded. This paper provides an overview of the SSAC
program, motivation for the workshop, details of the workshop activities and
outcomes, and recommendations for follow-on work.
1. Introduction & Background
The FAA has received complaints that the software aspects of certification for high integrity
applications require an inordinate amount of time and expense. Although public safety is the proper
concern of the government, excessive cost and time burdens can affect safety by contributing to
delays in adopting new, safety-enhancing technologies. To address concerns about time and expense,
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) began the Streamlining Software Aspects of Certification
(SSAC) program. The goal of the SSAC program is to determine whether the cost and time associated
with certifying aircraft can be reduced while maintaining or improving safety, with the intent of
impacting the Flight 2000 program (ref. F2000).
The first public activity of the SSAC program was a workshop in Fairfax, Virginia on 7-8 January
1998. This paper provides an overview of the SSAC program, motivation for the workshop, details of
the workshop activities and outcomes, and recommendations for follow-on work.
1.1 Motivation for SSAC Program
According to Huettner, "Aviation in the United States and throughout the world is in the midst of
a technological revolution as a result of recent advances in navigation, communications, and
computing technologies." (ref. Huettner) Software is at the heart of this revolution. Due to its
flexibility, software has become the medium of choice for enabling advanced automation in both
airborne and ground-based systems. In the October 1996 issue of Avionics Magazine, David W.
Robb wrote (ref. Robb):
"Avionics have never been more clearly at center stage. The benefits of fiat-
panel and heads-up displays, the precision of GPS positioning, the efficiency of
satellite communications, the revolution in automated test equipment, and the
flexibility of integrated avionics, to name just a few areas, are transforming
aviation almost faster than we can print these words .... It is no secret that
aircraft are becoming ever more dependent on their on-board electronics. The
emerging world of CNS and Free Flight promises to accelerate this trend
dramatically. As this equipment grows more capable and sophisticated, so does
the challenge of testing and maintaining it--for the largest airline to the smallest
General Aviation shop."
It is difficult and costly to demonstrate that complex, embedded, real-time software meets its
requirements and is safe. An intricate system of rules and regulations govern the use of software in
our aviation system. The 14 Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) sets forth the rules governing the
aircraft certification process. The airworthiness standards for general aviation and civil transport
aircraft are covered in 14 CFR part 23 and part 25, respectively. In particular, 14__CFR XX.1301 and
XX. 1309 require that aircraft systems meet their intended function, do not negatively impact other
systems or functions on the aircraft, and are safe for operation. To meet these requirements with
software, Advisory Circular # 20-115B specifies the use of RTCA/DO-178B Software Considerations
in Airborne System and Equipment Certification as a means for obtaining approval of digital computer
software (ref. AC 20-115B). Consequently, the DO-178B guidelines influence much of the software
development for the commercial civil transport and general aviation industries. With capabilities such
as the Future Air Navigation System (FANS) now providing a direct data link between airborne and
non-airborne systems, DO-178B may influence non-airborne systems in the near future.
The stated purpose of the DO-178B document is "to provide guidelines for the production of
software for airborne systems and equipment that performs its intended function with a level of
confidence in safety that complies with airworthiness requirements" (ref. DO-178B). These guidelines
represent the consensus of the avionics software community on the best software engineering
practices at the time the document was written. Software engineering is not a mature discipline, and
many questions still remain about the relative effectiveness and expense of various software
engineering methods and processes embodied in DO-178B.
Although no commercial airline crashes are directly attributed to software, there are several
instances where software errors have contributed to incidents. For brevity, only two examples are
given.
On December 12, 1991, an Evergreen International Airways Boeing 747 was in cruise flight at
31,000 feet. Suddenly, the aircraft entered a steep right bank and rapidly descended more than 10,000
feet. During the recovery, the right wing was damaged, including extensive damage to the honeycomb
structure on both sides of the wing. The crew successfully landed the aircraft, and no one was injured.
According to the Transportation Safety Board of Canada, the flight upset was caused by an
uncommanded, insidious roll input by the channel A autopilot. (ref. Billings)
The second incident occurred on May 12, 1997. An American Airlines Airbus A300B4-605R was
heading to Miami from Boston. While turning into a holding pattern, the A300 slowed from 210 knots
to 177 knots. Its stall warning system activated. Suddenly, the aircraft dropped from 16,000 feet to
13,000 feet while pitching and rolling to extreme bank angles both left and right. While the plane was
losing altitude and flying erratically, both the captain's and the fast officer's Electronic Flight
Instrument System (EFIS) primary flight displays and navigation displays went blank for 2-3 seconds.
On each screen, only white diagonal lines were displayed. One passenger was hurt during the
incident, and the plane had minor damage. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)
attributed the EFIS behavior to software saying that a feature of the software "results in the loss of all
primary flight displays at a time when pilots need their critical information the most." (ref. McKenna)
These types of errors, which are only examples of many that have occurred, lead to concerns
about the effectiveness of the certification procedures for this software, as embodied in DO- 178B. In
addition, there are economic concerns. As already mentioned, some people assert that software
aspects of certification for high integrity applications require an inordinate amount of time and
expense. The software aspects of certification are identified as the biggest barrier to meeting the
FAA's Flight 2000 goals and schedules. The Flight 2000 program will require acquisition,
development, and implementation of new software-intensive systems in both ground-based and
avionics domains. The schedule is tight, and participants in these technology demonstrations expect
to recoup their capital investments within a reasonable amount of time.
The FAA initiated the SSAC program in response to these concerns. The kick-off meeting for the
program was held in Washington, D. C. on 13-14 November 1997.
1.2 Overview of SSAC Program
The primary objectives of the SSAC program are to: 1) analyze the current software approval
process for certification and identify target areas for improvement, 2) determine if the desired safety
benefit justifies the expense burden, and 3) if necessary, establish streamlined processes for software
aspects of certification that are faster and less expensive than the current processes. Although
reducing cost and time is the goal of the SSAC program, these reductions must not compromise
safety. Short term cost savings that sacrifice safety could prove fiscally imprudent overall if public
confidence in aviation safety is lost. There are many examples today that support this premise.
1.2.1 Division Into Two Tracks
Prior to the January workshop, the FAA identified the need to sponsor two independent but
related efforts to address issues with software aspects of certification.
The objective of the first effort, referred to as Fast Track, is to determine immediate steps to
reduce cost and schedule of DO-178B certification activities for the Flight 2000 program, without
negatively affecting safety. Fast track concerns are characterized more as management and
programmatic in nature. Often, anecdotal evidence is sufficient to confirm these industry concerns.
Issues such as training, policy, and standardization fall into this category.
The second effort, more technical in nature, is intended to address concerns about the DO-178B
standard itself. Technical concerns typically require substantiated rather than anecdotal evidence to
establish validity. An example of such a concern is the assertion that modified condition/decision
coverage (me/de), which is required for Level A software, is not effective at finding errors. These
claims from a few, or even many, software developers are not enough to justify a change to the
requirement; however, they are enough to warrant further investigation. An example of further
investigation would be to determine if errors in Boolean logic are common in software development,
and in particular whether mc/dc is a cost effective means to test Boolean logic. This effort to identify
and address technical issues is referred to as the Technical Track*.
1.2.2 The Technical Track
The FAA assembled a team of technical experts to objectively identify the cost and schedule
drivers of software developed for systems requiring FAA approval and certification. In addition, the
team is to propose solutions for problems discovered, and, where feasible, prototype those solutions.
For lack of a better name, this team is called the Technical Team.
The Technical Team is led by Kelly Hayhurst, a research scientist at NASA Langley Research
Center. The other members of the team are Cheryl Dorsey from Digital Flight and Frank McCormick
from Certification Services, Inc., both Designated Engineering Representatives (DERs); Professor
John Knight from the University of Virginia; Professor Nancy Leveson from the University of
Washington, both experts in the field of software safety; Michael Holloway, a research engineer at
NASA Langley Research Center; and Jeffrey Yang, a software systems engineer from Mitre. The
lack of direct industry participation is intentional, to reduce the potential for bias towards or against
particular companies.
The lack of direct FAA participation is also intentional. The Technical Team is intended to serve
as an independent team to research issues and provide recommendations to the FAA. This does not
mean that the FAA is not participating fully. The SSAC Program Manager, Leanna Rierson (AIR-
130), provides guidance to the Technical Team and coordination with the Fast Track effort. In
addition, the FAA has established an advisory team for the SSAC program; its members are Arthur
Pyster (AIT-5), Michael DeWalt (ANM-106N), Roger Cooley (AIT-5), Peter S araceni (AAR-421),
James Williams (AIR-130), Ronald Stroup (ASW-190), and Joe Caravello (AIT-200).
" This work was supported by the FAA William J. Hughes Technical Center, Atlantic City International Airport, New
Jersey.
The mission of the Technical Team is to gather, analyze, and synthesize objective evidence
concerning cost and schedule drivers for software aspects of certification. The team's mission is not to
discredit DO-178B, replace RTCA Special Committee 190 (SC-190), or prescribe FAA policy, but
rather to validate or invalidate assertions about software aspects of certification. The work done by
this team would then be used to consider modification to policy or guidance by the FAA and RTCA
SC- 190/WG-52.
Historically, meaningful measurements of software engineering processes and products have been
frequently difficult and sometimes impossible to obtain. This is largely due to insufficient and
inconsistent measures for evaluating cost and quality. Standards, produced by forums such as the
RTCA, are based on the consensus of best engineering judgment and current best practice. In some
respects, this program is an attempt to see if the consensus process can be augmented by objective,
substantive data. The success of this program requires FAA and industry participation to ensure that
our investigation is relevant to their concerns. The Technical Team, government, and industry must
form a partnership to identify concerns, determine what data is available, find practical ways to get
that data, and understand what the data represents.
1.2.3 Technical Track Programmatics
The Technical Track has three phases:
• Data Collection and Analysis,
• Implementation, and
• On-going Activities
The goal of Phase I is to identify major concerns about cost and schedule drivers and to collect
data from both airborne and non-airborne systems development activities to either validate or
invalidate those concerns. The data collected should be specific enough to support new or alternate
guidance preparation by the FAA, as appropriate.
Specifically during this phase, the Technical Team must:
• solicit FAA and industry concerns with respect to the software aspects of certification
• classify the concerns as programmatic or technical
• define practical means for collecting data
• collect and analyze the data
• recommend changes in the certification process or in software development methods
The primary objective of Phase II is to evaluate the proposed recommendations. Ideally, real
development projects would be used to test the proposed recommendations. However, using real
projects to test recommendations requires close coordination with industry and the FAA. As the
proposed recommendations are prototyped, data will be collected to assess the effectiveness of those
recommendations, to propose refinements, and to identify other suitable solutions. Finally, Phase III
will focus on continuous improvement activities with further data collection and prototyping as
necessary.
To impact the FAA's Flight 2000 program, the current schedule requires that both Fast Track and
the Technical Track Phase I and Phase II be completed by November, 1999. Given the magnitude of
the project and the potential difficulties in collecting consistent metrics for cost, schedule, and
problem reports, the schedule is ambitious.
1.2.4 Early Decisions of the Technical Team
The original SSAC program plan called for the Technical Team to define the types of data to be
collected, identify the methods for collecting the data, and determine the metrics for analyzing it. The
Team would then present their work to industry for comment and criticism. Rather than run the risk
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of definingmetricsanddatacollectionmethodstoaddressnon-existentproblems,theTechnicalTeam
decidedto conductaworkshopto elicitconcernsabouthecertificationprocessfromindustry.This
paper further discussesthe workshop,the summaryand classificationof data collected,
recommendations,andproposedfollow-onactivities.
2. SSAC Industry Workshop
The workshop was held at the TRW facilities in Fairfax, Virginia on 7-8 January 1998. The
workshop objective was to solicit opinions from industry representatives on the following questions:
• Are the techniques prescribed in DO-178B effective?
• Can software aspects of certification be streamlined without affecting safety?
• Are costs incurred that do not contribute to safety?
2.1 Logistics and a Note on the Questionnaire
Logistics support was provided by TRW/Systems Engineering Technical Assistance
(TRW/SETA). In addition to choosing the location for the workshop, TRW/SETA compiled the
invitation lists, created information packets in consultation with the SSAC Program Manager, mailed
invitations and packets, and maintained the list of attendees.
The information packet sent to invitees included an informal questionnaire about software aspects
of certification. The questionnaire was written in a provocative manner, to hopefully stimulate
industry response and participation for the workshop. Questionnaire responses are found in Appendix
A.
Over 120 people attended the workshop, including representatives from the FAA, commercial
transport and general aviation aircraft manufacturers and suppliers, and procurers and developers of
non-airborne systems. A list of the attendees is given in Appendix B.
2.2 What We Planned to Happen
Prior to the workshop, each participant was placed in one of four groups, which for ease of
identification were labeled by the colors black, red, orange, and green. The intent was to ensure that
each group had participants from a cross-section of companies, organizations, and areas of
specialization. Each group was led by a member of the Technical Team. Professor Knight led the
black group; Professor Leveson led the red group. The orange and green groups were led by Cheryl
Dorsey and Frank McCormick, respectively. Each group also had a designated scribe to record the
comments.
To facilitate soliciting and recording comments, the Technical Team developed a Comments
Acquisition Table (CAT). The format of this table is shown in table 1.
Table 1. Comments Acquisition Table
Compliance
Comprehension
Completeness
Cost &
Effectiveness
Planning Requirements Design, Code,
& Integration
Verification CM, SQA, &
Certification
Liaison
Thecolumnsof thetablearebasedonthesoftwarelife cycleprocessesidentifiedbyDO-178B.
Therowsof thetablerepresentthefourattributestheTechnicalTeamconsideredimportantfor each
process:
• Compliance:HowwelldodevelopersfollowDO-178B?
• Comprehension:Howeasyis it tounderstandwhatDO-178Brequires?
• Completeness:Howmuct_ofthesoftwaredevelopmentiscoveredbyDO-178B?
• Cost& Effectiveness:Whatis thecostof applyingDO-178B?
Theplanwasfor eachgrouptoaddresseachcell of the CAT. For each cell, the group leaders
were instructed to have participants do the following: 1) document issues in detail with respect to that
life cycle process and that attribute, 2) define metrics to assess those issues, 3) determine viable
approaches to empirical evaluation, and 4) document alternative non-proprietary approaches. A
database tool was developed for the scribes to use to record their groups' responses for each cell in the
CAT.
2.3 What Really Happened
After introductory presentations providing motivation for and an overview of the SSAC program,
the workshop participants were divided into the four groups. Two of the groups were able to use the
CAT effectively for soliciting and recording comments; two of the groups were not. Whether the
CAT was used or not, the focus in each group was on disclosing and recording issues, not on
validating, debating, or trying to resolve them. Every issue that was raised was recorded, unless
everyone in the group agreed that it should not be. Thus, no one should infer from the inclusion of an
issue in the list that the issue is necessarily valid, nor should anyone infer an importance ranking for
the issues. Determining the validity and importance of the issues will be the subject of future work.
Four steps were taken to allow participants to express their concerns freely. First, no individual
or company names were recorded in the issues database. Second, time was set aside in each of the
groups during which no FAA personnel were permitted in the room. Third, participants were allowed
to submit anonymous written comments on index cards. Fourth, FAA participation was limited to
encourage open discussion.
Including four anonymous comments, a total of 215 issues were recorded during the discussion
sessions. These issues are listed in Appendix C. Due to the volume of issues raised and the time
spent expressing and recording them, very few issues address metrics, evaluation criteria, or
alternative approaches. Metrics, evaluation criteria, and alternate approaches recorded in the database
may be used for completing recommended future activities.
3. Classification of Issues
Even a casual perusal of the 215 workshop issues reveals that overlap and similarities exist.
Classification of these issues is somewhat subjective. Consistent classification of issues is difficult,
but necessary to provide focus and direction for further investigation and validation.
After several attempts, a workable scheme for classifying these issues was defined. Each
comment recorded at the workshop is mapped onto the classification scheme and presented in
Appendix D. As with most classification schemes, many issues are found in more than one category.
The hierarchy for the classification scheme is shown below:
Issuesthatarenotspecific_ IssueswithintheFAA
Issuesfromthe /to DO-178B Issues within Industry
SSAC Workshop_ Issues about the adequacy
Issues specific to DO- 178B _,_
of guidance in DO- 178B
Issues about the
benefits of DO- 178B
Each workshop issue was classified by whether or not the issue is specific to DO-178B. Issues
not specific to DO-178B include those things that would be likely to exist even if DO-178B did not.
Some of these issues mention DO-178B, but it is clear that the issue would remain even if major
changes were made to the standard. Issues that are specific to DO-178B involve the details of the
standard.
3.1 Issues That Are Not Specific to DO-178B
Most issues not specific to DO-178B are concerned with organizational and programmatic
matters such as communication, resource management, planning, and training. The issues not specific
to DO-178B were divided into the sub-categories: Issues within the FAA, and Issues within Industry.
Issues that involve people employed or authorized by the FAA, or procedures used or overseen by the
FAA are classified as "issues within the FAA." An issue was within industry if it involved people or
procedures over which the FAA had no direct control.
3.1.1 Issues within the FAA
The following issues fall under the sub-category "issues within the FAA":
1. Inconsistencies exist among ACOs in interpreting and following policy and guidance.
2. ACOs do not provide quick, meaningful responses to applicants.
3. Insufficient knowledge of software engineering and related disciplines exists within the FAA.
4. Inadequacies, inconsistencies, and inefficiencies exist in the DER system.
5. Insufficient information is available about the certification process.
6. Problems exist within the TSO, TC, STC, ATC, and PMA processes.
7. Working with non-U. S. certification authorities is difficult.
Each of the seven sub-categories is discussed separately and briefly.
• Inconsistencies exist among ACOs in interpreting and following policy and guidance.
In all four groups, issues related to inconsistencies among the FAA's various ACOs were
discussed frequently. These inconsistencies included varying documentation requirements, and
different interpretations of DO-178B requirements such as "with independence", "tool qualification",
and "partitioning". Workshop participants also cited instances of inconsistencies within the same
ACO when personnel changed.
Two specific comments from the database that fall within this sub-category are 1) "What plans
does the FAA have to monitor and regulate consistency between ACOs in compliance findings, and in
educating their people to be consistent?" and 2) "In areas of interpretation difficulty, much time is
spent in negotiating with regulators." The same issue was raised in a questionnaire response in the
followingway: "NotallACOsareequalwhenit comestorigorinanalysisandfairnessinjudgment.
Whatisrejectedinoneregionisacceptableinanother."
• ACOs do notprovide quick, meaningful responses to applicants.
Workshop participants asserted that ACOs respond slowly to submissions. Justifications for
information requests or revisions can be ambiguous. For example, a workshop participant asserted
that "Regulators buy time by asking irrelevant questions requiring a response from the applicant,
while stopping all review activities until after they receive the response."
• Insufficient knowledge of software engineering and related disciplines exists within the
FAA.
Another frequently asserted problem was the lack of adequately trained personnel, especially for
software issues. One workshop participant observed, "There is a definite lack of software experience
in the FAA on a national basis. The FAA has a few good people but like the Marines they need
more." Lack of knowledge about software and systems engineering can also cause problems. In one
group, participants discussed the hidden costs of applicants "caving in" to FAA demands that seem
unreasonable, solely to avoid schedule delays. Many participants thought that lack of knowledge
caused ACOs to take an overly conservative approach to compliance, relying on checklists instead of
informed engineering judgment.
• Inadequacies, inconsistencies, and inefficiencies exist in the DER system.
Some workshop participants thought the DER system does not work well for software aspects of
certification. Some thought that the FAA should delegate much more authority to the DERs than they
currently do. Others thought that the current qualification standards for DERs were inadequate.
• Insufficient information is available about the certification process.
Much of the information about the certification process is not well documented, and that which is
documented is not readily available to industry. As a specific example, one participant said, "There is
a lack of cenlxal repository for availability of the checklist used by the FAA, issue papers, policy
letters, etc."
• Problems exist within the TSO, TC, STC, ATC, and PMA processes.
Several participants thought the TSO, TC, STC, ATC, and PMA processes do not work nearly as
well for software aspects of certification as they do for other aspects of certification. An example
comment is, "Why is there a wide variance in software approval between TC, STC, TSO? How can
the processes be made more similar? How can the playing field be leveled?"
• Working with non-U. S. certification authorities is difficult.
Several workshop participants experienced difficulties in working with certification authorities
other than the FAA. Some thought that reciprocal agreements with other certification authorities were
not being granted or honored as often as in the past. A specific example cited in a questionnaire
response was this: "We are currently preparing for the Joint Aviation Authority (JAA) for a [product]
that was recently certified for the FAA. Preparation of additional documentation for the JAA software
certification will take about 200 hours. There are no additional software tests or analysis in this effort,
so the product will be identical."
3.1.2 Issues within Industry
Although industry participants had quite a few criticisms of the FAA, they did not ignore similar
concerns within their own companies. For issues within industry, three sub-categories were identified:
1. Insufficient knowledge of software engineering and related disciplines exists within
industry.
2. Lack of cooperation among companies increases costs.
3. Requirements definition is difficult independent of certification.
Each of these is discussed separately below.
• Insufficient knowledge of software engineering and related disciplines exists within
industry.
Some workshop participants asserted that industry lacks sufficient expertise in the disciplines
necessary for software development. One participant raised the issue of qualifying professionals in
software engineering, stating that: "Qualification for systems and software related work is not
formalized in the same sense as other engineering fields."
• Lack of cooperation among companies increases costs.
The failure of companies to share information with one another was cited as a contributor to
unnecessary costs. The following two comments are typical: "Companies spend a great amount of
resources researching which tools to use" and "Can an industry-wide group exist to do data gathering
on new topics? Issues include exposing dirty linen, so data needs to be kept without
company/person/system association."
• Requirements definition is difficult independent of certification.
At least one group spent time discussing their perceptions of the cost drivers in generic software
development efforts. According to that group, the "Greatest cost driver is poor requirements." Other
comments supporting the difficulties with requirements definition include "Poor requirements is a cost
driver" and "Minor requirements changes affect documentation and certification."
3.2 Issues That Are Specific to DO-178B
Classification of DO-178B specific issues was relatively straightforward, although determining
categories for these issues was much more difficult. The two categories used are: Issues about the
adequacy of guidance in DO-178B, and Issues about the benefits of DO-178B. The first category
includes those issues where workshop participants thought that the written guidance in DO-178B is
deficient, especially with respect to completeness and clarity of the existing guidance. The second
category covers DO-178B activities or objectives that were considered unnecessary or insufficiently
justified. It also includes assertions about things that might be missing from the standard.
3.2.1 Issues about the adequacy of guidance in DO-178B
Quite a few comments were made about the guidance offered in DO-178B. Those comments
were grouped into the following ten sub-categories addressing inadequate and ambiguous guidance in
DO-178B ... :
l, • .
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
for documentation
for planning and configuration management
for requirements definition and analysis
for partitioning
for verification activities
for tool qualification
for Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) software
for reuse of certification data
for reuse of legacy systems
for non-airborne systems
Each sub-category is discussed below.
• DO-178B has inadequate and ambiguous guidance for documentation.
Workshop participants asserted that the standard's documentation guidance is inadequate in at
least three ways. First, there are inadequate provisions for electronic document submission. "DO-
178B/ED-12B does not address modern documentation tool systems. The Certification Authority will
require hard copy documents and not accept access to the automatic document system," is a
representative comment.
Another perceived inadequacy is the failure to properly define when specific documents are due
to the certification authority. As one participant put it, there is an "issue of when the life cycle data
and qualification data are due, and when the FAA certification authority approvals are due. For
example, the PSAC is useless if not submitted or approved early enough to be effective."
Some participants also thought that the standard gave too much leeway to ACOs to determine
exactly what documents are required. One area in which this was asserted to be true is that of
derivative products: "Currently, complete plans are required for the derivatives, even if they are only
barely different from previous products. There is little value in producing the plan for the derivative."
• DO-178B has inadequate and ambiguous guidance for planning and configuration
management.
Some workshop participants thought that additional guidance is needed for planning. This was
expressed in one group by the following comment: "DO-178B is a what and not a how standard, and
experienced developers are able to understand the level of effort required. However, DO-178B does
not provide sufficient information for the new applicant to scope their level of effort."
Some participants also thought that configuration management was not discussed adequately. In
particular, there is "confusion about CC 1s and CC2s" and the "description in CM section is difficult to
understand."
• DO-178B has inadequate and ambiguous guidance for requirements definition and
analysis.
Some workshop participants thought that better guidance is needed for requirements definition
and analysis. For example, at least one person asserted that there is "much confusion caused by the
distinction between high and low level requirements." Another said that "lack of good requirements
definition impacts the cost of verification," and asked the question, "Is the guidance in DO-178B
sufficient and consistent to help the developer?" The potential impact of "implied requirements" was
also a concern, and the assertion was made that "DO-178B guidance should address how implied
requirements that affect safety should be addressed."
• DO-178B has inadequate and ambiguous guidance for partitioning.
The growing importance of partitioning was recognized by workshop participants. For example,
the question was asked, "what types of techniques are acceptable and what are the criteria to accept a
partitioning strategy?"
• DO-178B has inadequate and ambiguous guidance for verification activities.
Verification activities were discussed frequently in most of the groups. Areas of discussion
included, but were not limited to, structural coverage, independence, the conformity process, and
regression analysis. Example comments include "DO-178B/ED-12B fails to provide clear direction
on regression analysis", "For lower levels of software, there are different interpretations about the
extent to which testing has to be done on the target," and there are "Different interpretations of the
applicability of coverage analysis techniques to different stages of verification."
• DO-178B has inadequate and ambiguous guidance for tool qualification.
Tool qualification was another area that was the subject of much discussion. Some people
asserted explicitly that DO-178B has deficient guidance in this area: "DO-178B/ED-12B does not
clearly define the difference between development and verification tools and the requisite
requirements." Others suggested that the intent of the standard is often misunderstood: "There is
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majormisunderstandingof the intent behind the tool qualification requirements in DO-178B/ED-12B.
In many cases more stringent requirements are imposed than intended or the requirements are
misapplied to inappropriate items."
• DO-178B has inadequate and ambiguous guidance for COTS software.
Unlike many of the other areas in which multiple, similar comments were recorded, each group
recorded only one comment about COTS. This does not mean that workshop participants did not
consider this an important area; they did. One group recorded the concern this way: it is "imperative
to develop a set of guidelines to establish how COTS can and will be certified."
• DO-178B has inadequate and ambiguous guidance for reuse of certification data.
Some workshop participants thought that DO-178B does not provide adequate support for the use
of data from previous certifications in new certifications. Comments in this area included "The reuse
of certification data is extremely difficult", and "Same product, different customers causes a repetition
of activities."
• DO-178B has inadequate and ambiguous guidance for reuse of legacy systems.
This category differs from the previous one in that it refers to reuse of data from systems certified
under standards other than DO-178B. Systems previously certified under DO-178A were the subject
of particular concern: "DO-178B does not provide adequate guidance for migrating legacy programs
being used. A legacy may not have done its certification to meet DO-178B objectives, but still may
be a safe system", and "Forcing the use of DO-178B/ED-12B on systems originally developed to DO-
178A is intrusive and expensive especially when there is extensive service experience."
• DO-178B has inadequate and ambiguous guidance for non-airborne systems.
The final area in which workshop participants expressed dissatisfaction with the current guidance
in DO-178B was non-airborne systems. One group asserted that there is an "issue of how to certify
human-computer interface software to be compliant with DO-178B. As a result, cost, schedule, and
safety may be impacted. This may be difficult to get air and ground community to agree." Someone
in another group claimed to be "having a difficult time determining who in the FAA approves ground
systems, and getting different answers. Most common answer is to do the most expensive thing
possible."
3.2.2 Issues about the benefits of DO-178B
the final category "Issues about the benefits of DO-178B", four sub-categories wereUnder
identified.
1. The extent to which DO-178B provides benefits beyond those that are provided by other
industry accepted practices is unclear.
2. The effectiveness of some specific activities required by DO-178B is unclear.
3. DO-178B inadequately provides for innovation.
4. DO-178B inadequately addresses the effect of software on the safety of the overall
system.
Each is discussed below.
• The extent to which DO-178B provides benefits beyond those that are provided by other
industry accepted practices is unclear.
Some of the workshop participants thought that their internal company practices were sufficient to
ensure the quality and safety of their products. For example, one person asserted that their company
had "parallel, or shadow, processes --- one to develop the product, the second to satisfy certification
objectives." Another asked, "... shouldn't a sound development methodology suffice?"
Suggestions were also made that the FAA should give certification credit to a company based on
its rating by process auditing organizations such as the Software Engineering Institute (SEI) or the
II
International Standards Organization (ISO). This idea was expressed like this: "Why couldn't SEI
maturity level be used as an alternate means?"
While some participants wanted increased concentration on process, others criticized DO-178B
for concentrating too heavily on process. For example, contrast the following two comments: "DO-
178B does not allow for qualification of process once versus product each time," and "Transition
criteria forces developers to focus on process rather than products and does this focus on process,
versus product, affect safety?"
• The effectiveness of some specific activities required by DO-178B is unclear.
While the previous category included concerns about the overall effectiveness of DO-178B, this
category includes concerns about the effectiveness of specific requirements of DO-178B. Activities
whose effectiveness was questioned included, but were not limited to, preparing documentation,
tracing requirements to code, establishing independence, and demonstrating structural coverage. For
example, in one group the assertion was made that "One of the major software development costs has
been requirement changes resulting in rework changes. DO-178B/ED-12B exacerbates this issue due
to the stringent requirements for documentation that may not be done otherwise."
• DO-178B inadequately provides for innovation.
In various ways, workshop participants asserted that DO-178B did not provide adequately for the
use of innovative techniques. Many people thought that the approach taken by DO-178B to permit
alternate means of compliance is not working well: "DO-178B specifies that alternative methods can
be used as long as the objectives are met, but in practice it is not feasible." Also, "Alternative
methods are not up to date with current software development methods. A means [is needed] to
easily/genetically accommodate advances in technology without specifically including the technology
in the document. DO-178B/ED-12B forces the applicant to address the objectives directly which may
not be applicable for a given technology or the base intent of the objective."
• DO-178B inadequately addresses the effect of software on the safety of the overall
system.
The last category in our classification includes concerns about the relationship between DO-178B
requirements and the effect of software on system safety. Discussions about safety were frequent.
Here is an example comment: "The objective of certifying software is safety. DO-178B does not
specifically address safety. Unless we assume all the safety areas are covered by systems and all
software has to do is replicate the system correctly. The end software product design needs to be
checked for safety."
This completes the discussion of our classification scheme. Although others might classify the
issues differently, the scheme presented here provides a basis for discussing future work. Our
recommendations for future work are given in the next section.
4. Recommendations
As shown in the previous section, the classification has four main sub-categories:
• Issues within the FAA
• Issues within Industry
• Issues about the adequacy of guidance in DO-178B
• Issues about the benefits of DO-178B
The classification scheme presented in section three signifies the need for a multifaceted approach
to the streamlining software aspects of certification task. The issues identified in each of the four
main sub-categories should be addressed differently and by different groups. In particular, the last
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sub-categorycontainsthoseissuesappropriatefortheTechnicalTeam.Specificrecommendationsfor
eachsub-categoryfollow.
4.1 For Issues Within the FAA
For several reasons, issues within the FAA should be handled by Fast Track rather than the
Technical Team. These issues involve internal FAA personnel and procedures, and only the FAA has
the authority necessary to make those changes. Determining the validity, or lack thereof, of most of
these issues does not require the type of comprehensive data collection for which the Technical Team
was formed. For some of the issues, little or no new data should be required. For others, the required
data is either already available within the FAA, or simple to obtain from industry.
Perhaps a more important reason why Fast Track should handle these issues is that workshop
participants claimed that these issues cause the most frustration and account for a large percentage of
the unnecessary costs and schedule delays. Resolution of the technical issues without some kind of
resolution of the internal FAA issues is insufficient. Addressing these issues quickly, as Fast Track is
intended to do, should go a long way towards both developing trust and cooperation with industry and
reducing unnecessary costs and delays.
Not all issues recommended for Fast Track can be handled quickly. For example, consider the
issue Insufficient knowledge of software engineering and related disciplines exists within the FAA.
Determining whether this is true should be simple; the FAA probably already knows the answer. If it
is true, devising and implementing an appropriate strategy to address it will not be easy.
For some of these issues, the FAA already has some programs in place. For example, training
courses for FAA management and personnel (airborne and non-airborne) on the use and misuse of
DO-178B are currently in progress. In conjunction with the training program, topics requiring
additional policy will be identified and addressed. Standardization issues are also being studied.
4.2 For Issues Within Industry
Obviously, organizational and programmatic issues within industry should be handled by
industry. Training and communication issues especially are common within most industries.
However, addressing issues about insufficient knowledge or lack of cooperation is beyond the
legitimate scope of either the SSAC program or the government. It is not our job to dictate to industry
how they should train their people or how they should get along.
Addressing the difficulty of requirements definition is different, in that a legitimate role may exist
for government-sponsored research. Such research, however, is beyond the scope of the SSAC
program.
4.3 For Issues about the adequacy of guidance in DO-178B
Many of the issues within this category should be handled by SC-190/WG-52. Others can
perhaps be handled by Fast Track. Determining which are appropriate for SC-190/WG-52 and which
are appropriate for Fast Track should be done by representatives from both groups. For several of the
sub-categories, SC-190/WG-52 already has established teams. Although participation in SC-
190/WG-52 by individual members of the Technical Team is appropriate, it would not be appropriate
for the Technical Team as a whole to address these issues.
4.4 For Issues about the benefits of DO-178B
Although the issues identified in this category are probably the most difficult to validate and
remedy, the Technical Team is best suited to address these. The technical aspects of the software
approval process should be based on sound, objective foundations. This requires objective data
collection and analysis to establish the benefits of those activities required by DO-178B.
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Data collection for these issues requires that the Technical Team have unprecedented access to
cost, time, reliability, and safety data from both industry and the FAA. Unlike the first three sub-
categories, these issues can not be validated with anecdotal information collected from questionnaires
or interviews. It is with reference to these types of issues that Professor Leveson said at the
workshop, "The plural of anecdote is not data."
Schedule and cost constraints prohibit the Technical Team from analyzing each individual issue
to determine the specific data requirements. A more suitable approach, and one that reduces
duplication of effort, is to investigate the root cause underlying all, or many, of the issues.
What is the root cause? There is a lack of evidence to establish the overall cost-benefit of the
current process for software aspects of certification, especially in relation to alternative approaches.
In part, the lack of evidence is due to insufficient measures or inadequate attempts to measure many
aspects of software engineering. The recommendations of the Technical Team involve defining and
collecting data that will permit accurate determination of both the costs of the current process and the
associated benefits. There are three specific recommendations: 1) to collect cost data on software
projects, 2) to collect safety and reliability data for systems developed under DO-178A and B, and 3)
to collect benefit data on alternate means of compliance.
4.4.1 CoUecting Cost Data
The t'n'st recommendation is to collect basic cost information on software projects. This data
would be collected from both the FAA and the manufacturers for each project. The following types
of information would be required:
• project start and stop date
• project size
• software level
• type of system (function and whether it was based on an existing company product line
or a new company product line)
• type of aircraft
• type of approval sought
• development costs, including number of work-hours
• development process used
• verification methods employed
• quality assurance records
• software development background and experience in using DO-178B
• basic software metrics such as number of source lines of code, programming language
used, complexity index, and similar things
• number and types of changes prior to and after approval.
This information should lead to an understanding of the costs of the current software approval
process. Although companies may be reluctant to provide some of this information, most of it should
exist in some form or another.
4.4.2 Collecting Safety and Reliability Data
The information required to understand the primary benefits (those intended to assure safety and
reliability) of the current certification process may be more difficult to collect. For software, no good
metrics exist for safety or reliability. Thus, information on key indicators of safety and reliability
must suffice.
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Towardsthatend,theTechnicalTeamshouldcollectinformationon thesoftwaresafetyand
reliabilityof systemsdevelopedunderDO-178AandB. Shouldcompaniesbeunwillingtoprovide
internaldataaboutsafetyandreliabilityof fieldedsystems,recordsuchasAirworthinessDirectives
andincidentandaccidentreportswill beused.Thisdatashouldthenbecomparedwithsafetyand
reliabilitydatafromsoftwarecriticalsystemsinothercommunities,uchasthemilitary,thenuclear
industry,andthemedicalindustry.To securea morecompletepictureof softwaresafetyand
reliability,anomalydataofdigitalsystemscapturedin-flightmightbeworthpursuing.
4.4.3 Collecting Benefit Data
Finally, cost and benefit data for innovative or alternative methods should be addressed. The
Technical Team should collect experience data on new or alternative methods of compliance. To do
this well requires a common database and a consistent data definition for comparisons among
methods.
As these recommendations are further fleshed out, a minimum set of data required for analyses
will be defined. This data will then be used to objectively determine the cost-benefit of DO-178B.
Access to accurate information about company practices, costs and schedules, and software quality is
essential. Without that access, there will be insufficient data to build sound, objective foundations for
making decisions and suggestions for improvement.
5. Concluding Remarks
No program to streamline costs can succeed without addressing the fundamental issues associated
with certification and safety. A new FAA initiative called Streamlining Software Aspects of
Certification is investigating ways to reduce the cost and time associated with certifying aircraft while
maintaining or improving safety. As part of the SSAC program, a Technical Team has been
established to identify the cost and schedule drivers of aviation software, to propose solutions for any
problems discovered, and to prototype those solutions.
As part of this effort, the Technical Team conducted the SSAC Industry Workshop to gain a
better understanding of the major concerns in industry about cost and schedule. Over 120 people
attended the workshop, including representatives from the FAA, commercial transport and general
aviation aircraft manufacturers and suppliers, and procurers and developers of non-airborne systems.
Workshop participants freely expressed their issues about software aspects of certification.
The workshop issues were partitioned into four major categories: issues within the FAA, issues
within industry, issues about the adequacy of guidance in DO-178B, and issues about the benefits of
DO-178B. The Technical Team proposed three specific recommendations to address these concerns:
1) collect cost data on software projects, 2) collect safety and reliability data for systems developed
under DO-178A and B, and 3) collect benefit data on alternate means of compliance. The ultimate
goal of the Technical Team is to collect data that can help provide an empirical basis from which
decisions about software aspects of certification can be made. If appropriate, new guidance might be
created to reduce the cost and time associated with software aspects of certification while maintaining
or improving safety.
In response to concerns about previous unsuccessful attempts at process improvement, the
Technical Team will prepare an action plan in coordination with the FAA to provide additional detail
on how the workshop issues will be addressed. A second SSAC Industry Workshop is planned for
May 1998 to present this plan to industry. In addition, the progress and results of this project will be
made publicly available through a NASA-sponsored web page (http://shemesh.larc.nasa.gov/ssac/).
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Appendix A
Responses to the Questionnaire
The following questions were asked in an informal questionnaire distributed with the invitation to
participate in the SSAC Industry Workshop:
1. Do you believe there are opportunities to reduce cost/schedule impacts of the certification
process without jeopardizing safety? What are they?
2. What is the impact of DO- 178B on your organization and process?
3. What has been imposed on you due to DO-178B that you think has no value added?
4. Do you think that DO-178B implementation enhances the safety/quality/reliability of the
product? How?
5. Have you had any experiences with certification authorities that have resulted in added cost
and scheduling with no value-added? If so, what are they?
6. What other issues do you have with the certification process that adds to cost and delays in the
schedule?
7. List alternatives to DO-178B that you think can be used without sacrificing
safety/reliability/quality.
The purpose of these questions was to stimulate thinking about software aspects of certification
and to stimulate industry response and participation for the workshop. A total of 16 responses to the
survey questions were received. However, not all respondents answered all seven questions. Each of
the following tables, Tables A1-A7, contains the responses to one of the survey questions.
Information about the respondents has been deleted.
Table A 1. Do you believe there are opportunities to reduce cost/schedule impacts of the
certification process without jeopardizing safety? what are they?
Yes. I believe that cost can be reduced by making more use of previously developed software usually
called commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS). This would reduce development schedule but some increase in
testing would be expected. The USA military and western European military aircraft fly without FAA
certified software. The cost of doing the military software is usually about the same as level "D" DO-
178B software.
Qualifying, certifying routines or Sub-routines. So they can be used in different applications providing
the level is satisfactory.
Eliminate the redundancies inherent in the software verification documents.
When a submittal, argument, or request in regards to software is made, the FAA should commit to a
completion date. It has been our experience that software related delays are not directly in the project
managers control. Changing software is a major task that impacts our projects by man-months. A
simplified version of the change process with respect to documentation (not less testing) could reduce
this impact.
Yes. By addressing safety from the beginning and designing it into the system. The certification process
should be based on safety and not in checking boxes and paper work.
Yes. Refer to the body of this letter. We feel strongly that the safety aspects of software certification
should NOT be reduced in order to streamline. This process should not be used to provide for blanket
approval of software developed for non-aviation environments unless that software can be found to meet
the appropriate safely criteria including configuration management and production control. We do not
find the requirements of DO-178B to be excessive or cumbersome; however, we do often find the FAA
certification process to be unacceptably slow and unresponsive.
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TableA1. Concluded.
Yes.Most, if not all, of the steps outlined in DO-178B are necessary for safety reasons. The problem we
faced was the learning curve. On numerous occasions we were 'off the mark' as to what was being asked
for. There is some ambiguity when reading the text and associated tables, and there is little guidance
material. Many times we found ourselves wondering "What are they getting at?" To properly prepare a
document, it is beneficial to understand the topic in the spirit in which it was written. We found too
much emphasis on the conformance of the design and requirements documents to the associated
standards. We performed far too many iterations addressing whether the documents were formatted
correctly. The pertinent questions regarding conformance to standards should be related solely to safety,
not style. Perhaps this is self-inflicted, as a result of poorly conceived standards, but these standards were
themselves reviewed and iterated several times by both the FAA and an independent verification _roup.
Yes, provide appropriate system safety engineering at inception of design and make this part of
certification process.
Emphasize stringent functional/performance testing, software reliability testing. Do it right the first time
to minimize the need for repeated re-certifications. Integrate safety and software processes.
The structural coverage analysis is required on target code for software level A (of par. 6.4.4.2 of DO
178B). An analysis should be done to confirm the opportunity of performin 8 this activity on source code.
Yes. We use the same version of a software module for multiple similar products. When we have a
problem report on that code, we must retest it in all the products that use that software. This is required
by section 11.3.h. We feel that we should be able to reference the problem report and testing performed
on the same software in previously certified products without repeating this effort for each product that
uses this software module. We feel the requirements of section 11. I 0 concerning the documentation of
the Design Description are excessive, especially for very small projects, or software projects where the
development is based on a previously developed and documented software platform. We also feel that
Level C should not require statement coverage. We feel requirements based test coverage is sufficient
for Level C software to provide an acceptable level of safety/quality/reliability.
Yes there are several ways that costs can be reduced and schedules maintained. Some ways to reduce the
cost and schedule of the software life cycle are: a) Use of automated tools to reduce each phase
(specification, design, code, test) of the life cycle process, b) Design software to be reusable. By use of
object oriented design and making code database driven when possible, c) Successful use of metrics to
estimate present and future systems, d) Develop better software safety and risk assessment methods.
The document itself could be modernized and written in a more "user-friendly" manner. It should not
take a DO-178 "expert" to implement; this reduces the safety improvement impact due to diminished
understanding and thus diminished implementation of 178 processes and practices. It also adds to the
amount of cost in dollars and schedule to reach a clear understanding and implementation plan. During
system concept development phases, software is often prototyped to demonstrate concepts. Methods to
address previously developed prototyped should be added to incorporate the flexibility inherent in
software development while maintainin 5 safe processes.
Better guidance to the interpretation and implementation of DO-178B is strongly needed. A set of
reference designs or industry best practice documents would be a great tool towards this goal. The FAA
should accept more electronic data rather than its reliance on paper. The FAA needs more staff at the
ACO to keep the backlog down and have a proper turn time on submittals. This is especially the case
when the ACO is out of the office for extended periods of time with no one else to continue their work in
their absence. In an effort to reduce certification time without sacrificing safety, the ACO should rely
more on an independent review of software submittals by an approved Software DER. Currently, the
ACO re-reviews and audits the software submittals already accepted by an approved DER.
Based on the criticality level of developed software, there seems to be no identifiable magnitude of
software specified. A small effort (measured in LOC or executable byte size) is expected to be document
the same as a large effort.
There are 2 prime areas that are candidates for cost/schedule impact reduction. The first is use of CASE
tools to automatically generate certified software. The second is to determine how much safety is gained
by using DO-178B Level A, instead of Level B.
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TableA2. Whatis theimpactofDO-178Bonyourorganizationandprocess?
WespendagreatdealoftimemakingsureoursubcontractorsadheretoDO-178B. We review much of
their documentation even though it will go to the FAA for review prior to TSO or TC. We are duplicating
what the FAA should do and has little personpower or capability to do.
Our products are all DO-178B certified since software is extensively used in digital audio system as well
as SSCVER and SELLAL Systems.
Generally, the impact is good. It is a reliable way to verify that our software is well tested and
documented. However, too much of a good thing can also be bad. The certification process needs
flexibility based on the product being produced. [company statement deleted]. A small group of
individuals write, test, and implement the software. In our case, we could effectively govern our software
activity with half the documents. Extensive manpower in engineering, marketing, and secretarial is
required to update documents and process change for even minor changes.
If implemented without planning and coordination or finding it may be a major impact to current
developments that are not compliant with.
DO-178B does not add significantly to our software development costs. We would need to assure
ourselves that software meets a level of safety appropriate to its intended function even if there were no
DO-178B, In fact, having an accepted tool to apply for this purpose probably reduces our development
costs. DO-178B is not a 'test" document, but one that applies to the entire software development and
configuration processes. Without accepted guidance, we would have to develop our own methods of
assuring ourselves as well as certification authorities, that the software provides an appropriate safety
level. We have had significant cost and schedule impact associated with compliance finding in spite of
having our own Software DERs. Significant improvement can be made in this area. Please refer to the
body of this letter
We have two main product lines, each with approximately the same sales potential. Every project in one
line must conform to DO-178B. Some projects in the other line may require DO-178B. Every DO-
178B project is burdened with at least a nine month lead time to delivery. We turned a non-DO-178B
project from inception to delivery in 5 1/2 months, counting hardware, software and manufacturing
times. We believe it will be cost-effective to hire additional employees to perform the Independent
Verifications in-house. In the first project, we spent about 20% of the total project cost in contracting this
service out.
If the input safety analysis is inappropriate, it will cost excessive money.
It is better than DO-178B for software acquisition management.
DO-178A described software development in terms of objectives, offering industry the possibility to
present its own solution in order to meet these objectives. DO 178B is much more directive, making it
difficult to present its own means of compliance, in accordance with its company methodology and
progress plan.
We feel that other that the issues mentioned above, the requirements of DO-178B provide an acceptable
guideline for software development.
[Our] systems that require deliverable software are presently using DO-178B as a guideline for the
development of this software. The software life cycle process in place is tailored to address all areas that
DO-178B covers. The impact is a large amount of certification paper work required to show compliance
with DO- 178B.
DO-178B has had a positive impact. It forces rigorous processes and constant improvements to the
3rocesses.
DO-178B has forced a documentation requirement on our engineering (SW) design group. It is an
attempt at structured design - yet can be worked around. The design engineers are often not the ones
require to produce the documents.
There are many benefits to a standard such as DO- 178B. It forces discipline in all areas of software
development that result in a safer product. It has been a good tool for us to enforce safety and quality in
the engine control software that we procure. On the other hand, this type of software development in
very expensive and it makes it difficult for smaller, innovative companies to get in to the business of
developing safety-critical avionics software.
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TableA3. WhathasbeenimposedonyouduetoDO-178Bthatyouthinkhasnovalueadded?
Wedon'tallow our suppliers to use COTS unless it is previously certified because it is our experience
that the certification process as presently invoked by DO-178B is too costly unless software is designed
from the start with the meeting of DO-178B goals as an objective. It is not obvious to me that level "B"
and level "A" requirements add the cost equivalent of safety/quality to the product. This is particularly
true of the independence requirements.
Re-certification to DO-178B when equipment was DO-178A (Level D)
The compliance matrices are valuable tools for integrating the software document into a cohesive
interrelated package. However, reducing the size and number of these matrices would benefit both the
FAA and the software developing companies. The fact that all changes are considered major changes
(with very few exceptions) and need fall certification approval. All software changes are not major and a
simpler certification change process would reduce unnecessary work for both parties. Approve from the
beginning of program the appropriate software level per DO-178B definitions without pushing for higher
than required levels for months or years.
Nothing this far.
Nothing. There is an inverse relationship and disproportionate amount of value added by higher levels of
structural analysis. Structural analysis adds significant cost and yields marginal benefits. Most of the
unnecessary expenses we associate with software certification are not because of the requirements of DO-
178B. They are due to the FAA certification processes.
There was far too much focus and discussion on how a document should be presented so that it would
pass an audit. I am unsure of the value of some of the code requirements such as having no dead code or
unused variables. I would maintain that unused variables are not detrimental if it does not cause your
processor to run out of memory to declare them. (The memory map is checked for this condition).
Likewise, if you can prove that code is truly unreachable, it should also be deemed safe. These two
restrictions affect our ability to have common routines between different Configuration Items when only
small differences in functionality are apparent. In this case you must completely test two very-similar
modules, which is arguably redundant.
True - when DO-178B is applied to an open s)_stem, it is inappropriately applied.
The biggest impact is certifying to Level A. We believe there is little benefit to Level A versus Level B.
The key differences between Level A and Level B are: a) Verifying object code that is not directly
traceable to source code (section 6.4.4.2.a) b) Independence for verifying software architecture and
partitioning (Table A-4) c) Independence for verifying source code complies with architecture and is
"accurate and consistent" (Table A-5) d) Independence for verifying object code is robust with low-
level requirements (Table A-6) e) Independence for verifying test results (Table A-7). Many of the
independence requirements are not necessary since the software testing is assurance that the previous
software processes were performed correctly. Level B also requires a disciplined and independent QA
organization which will handle any concerns that the software developers might be coerced into releasing
software that is not safe (i.e. due to budget and schedule constraints). The only other issue is low level
software testing. DO-178B Section 6.4.4.2.b requires software structural coverage. The two differences
in the requirements for Level A and Level B are that Level A requires "each condition in a decision takes
on every possible outcome at least once" and "each condition is shown to independently affect the
decision outcome". These two additional criteria are essentially testing the compiler. In my experience,
there has not been one defect found by this testing. The reliability of compilers (especially Ada) has
become much better in the last 5 years. Because of the amount of time to perform this work, and the
very limited benefit, this is one area that could be reduced or eliminated. This type of testing should be
done by the compiler vendor. One suggestion is to have the FAA maintain a list of compilers that can not
be used for safety critical applications. This list could be made accessible to all applicants via electronic
media.
Quality of software suffers when the software level in C or below. Long-term acquisition cost is
increased.
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TableA3. Concluded
Verificationofoutputs of software coding process should be covered by testing of outputs of software
integration process. For example, source code complies with low-level requirements is covered by
executable object code complies with low-level requirements, while low level test activity, and specific
source code aspects like source code conforms to standards should be covered with a source code sample
covering all coders and all languages.
None.
The position by some that it more than a guideline and must be followed to the letter. This causes a lot of
excess generation of information to be redundantly placed in many documents.
Nothing.
If 178B were not in affect, I'm afraid no structured approach would even be considered. The importance
of the structured approach is not clearly enforced or appreciated.
Table A4. Do you think that DO-178B implementation enhances the
safety/quality/reliability of the product? How?
I believe that adhering to an effective (i.e. it produces the desired result) process is necessary to produce a
safe and quality product. Software is always reliable and exhibits only unreliable behavior when executed
on unreliable hardware. We should perhaps make sure that the hardware is always reliable, i.e. enough
memory and processing power to start with and environmentally sound (DO- 160 now). DO- 178B
provides guidance to an effective process, it is not the only process. DO- 178A must have been good
enough for a while since aircraft certified under that spec are still flying. The MIL-STDs produced
effective software processes as there are many aircraft produced under MIL-STD- 1679 and DOD-STD-
2167A that are still flying.
Yes, it's providing ourselves visibility and the assurance that software is properly tested and supported
during development.
Based on the success of our software in the field today, I would have to agree that the implementation of
DO-178B enhances the safety, quality, and reliability of our products. Once we have completed the
certification process there are very few changes. The changes that are made are implemented for
_erformance purposes and not safety issues. The testing methodology and implementation is valid.
Not necessarily. You can follow the whole process and not get enhancements or proof of better safety,
quality or reliability.
In general, yes. It causes us to be more thorough than we might have been otherwise.
It is appropriate for reliability and quality. It is not directly appropriate to system safety.
Levels A, B software enhances software quality. Adequately performed system hazard analysis and
subsequent PSSA enhances safety. DO-178B lacks emphasis on reliability testing; software reliability
suffers under DO-178B.
Yes. By requiring consistent design, coding, documentation and record keeping.
Yes, the DO-178B guidelines helps to define and steer the development of a software product through a
software life cycle process. It provides a good emphasis on requiring the traceability of requirements
through each phase of the software process.
The discipline and thoroughness required by DO-178B definitely can increase reliability and quality.
DO-178B used in conjunction with methods and architectural considerations of ARP-4754 and ARP-
4761 can definitely increase system safety.
The 178B approach (philosophy) provides for definable, explainable, code. Review cycles (when
seriously conducted) allow errors to be found, ideas to be communicated, abstractions to be discussed.
Requirement definition narrows the target, but forcing requirements to be written when its not clear how
to is fruitless.
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Table A4. Concluded
Yes - absolutely. A structured process of requirement-driven development with an emphasis on
verification and validation as well as quality assurance and configuration management is essential. DO-
178B provides an accepted guideline for accomplishing its objectives. There are probably other
guidelines which may also be acceptable in order to be able to provide the appropriate assurances;
however, if they are equivalent, and they are applied it should not be difficult to show that the objectives
of DO-178B have been met. DO-178B is somewha: daique in that it is objective oriented not process
oriented. You can use other guidelines or standards and still meet the objectives of DO-178b. I have
evaluated software developed to ML-STD-2167 for DO-178B compliance. While the MIL-STD does not
allow for different levels of software, and I would not go so far as to say that all software developed in
accordance with the MIL-STD also meets all DO-178B objectives, it was not difficult in this case to
determine that the software did in fact meet DO-178B objectives for level C software. DO-178B is a very
good guideline and, we believe it would be difficult to replace it and still provide the same level of safety
with anything that is more "streamlined." It is undoubtedly possible to replace it with other guidance
material which provides for an equivalent level of safety, but it is difficult to see where any reduction in
burden could be obtained from such an activity.
Yes. The activities and objectives of DO-178B are ones that require proper systems and software design
processes that leads to better safety, reliability, and quality of the software product.
Yes, DO-178B implementation does improve safety. It forces small and start-up companies to take a
methodical approach to software development and testing. It requires a financial and engineering
commitment to the testinl] and safety of the software products.
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TableA5. Haveyouhadanyexperienceswithcertificationauthoritiesthathaveresultedin
addedcostandschedulingwithnovalue-added?If so,whatarethey?
TherehavebeeninstancescitedtomethoughI havenotbeenpartytothemwherethingswereredone
usttotakecreditforgettingthemdoneundertheFAAreviewingeyethataddednovalueandcaused
telays/scheduleproblems.Thisusuallyonlyhappensonce.Onceisenout_h.
Whenequipmenthasbeeninstalledforaircraftoryears(beforeDO-178Abeinginforce).Fornew
releaseofDO-178C...D...E,closelyverifythatpreviouslyqualifyinganycertifyingequipmentshouldnot
re-qualify.
LongdelaysintheprogrambecauseofinsufficientmanpowerattheFAA.Specifically,becauseonly
onepersonisresponsibleforsoftware latedissues.TheimplementationofPSACbytheFAAis
ambiguousandfromourexperienceleadstoyearsindelays.Theclearcutmannerinwhichhardware
requirementsandhardwareverificationdocumentsareapprovedshouldbeusedasanexampleofhowto
implementtheaspectsofsoftwarecertification.Notapprovingthepropersoftwarel velpertheDO-
178Bdefinitions.
Notapplicable.
Yes,seethebodyof thisletter.Compliancefindingandre-useofpreviouslyevaluatedsoftwareaddthe
highestcostandunnecessaryscheduledelays.
Yes.I believeI'vedetailedthesein1)and3).
Yes-WAAS
No.Ontheotherhand,thecertificationauthoritiesarenotstrongenoughinenforcingDO-178B
guidance.Sometimes,theyarenotconsistenti applicationfDO-178Bguidance(differencesamong
certificationauthorities-somebranchandacrossbranches.)
No.
It wouldbehelpfulforthesamecertificationauthority,whenpossible,beinvolvedwithagivenproject
frombeginningtoend.Thiswouldallowforamoreconcurrentsoftwareproductprocesstotakeplace
betweenthecertificationauthorityandvendor.
Yes.Therearesignificantdifferencesin theunderstandingofsoftwareandsystemsdesignfromACO
regiontoregion.NotallACOsareequalwhenit comestorigorinanalysisandfairnessinjudgment.
Whatisrejectedinoneregionisacceptableinanother.Therearesignificantdifferencesinbacklogfrom
ACOtoACOresultinl_inmuch_reaterthan30dayresponsestosubmittals.
Oftenupdatesarerequiredtodocumentation.ThispaperworkcausesdelayinreceivingTSOapproval
andheftydocumentpublishingtimeandmaterials.Some"updates"aretypographicalinnature,others
addclarification.If adocumentcouldbeapprovedwithupdatestofollow- or by magnetic media
aublication it would help.
Yes. We are currently preparing a package for the Joint Aviation Authority (JAA) for an engine that was
recently certified for the FAA. Preparation of additional documentation for the JAA software
certification will take about 200 hours. There are no additional software tests or analysis in this effort, so
the product will be identical. These hours are strictly for creating reports. Better coordination of the
certification authority regulations would eliminate this unnecessary expense.
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TableA6. Whatother issues do you have with the certification process
that adds to cost and delays in the schedule?
There is inconsistency in FAA offices in the interpretation of DO-178B. There is a definite lack of
software experience in the FAA on a national basis. The FAA has a few good people but like the marines
they need more. Not being able to Eet answers on a local level adds to schedule and cost.
Re-qualification when new standards are in force.
We deal with several certification offices. However only one office knows the detailed aspects of our
products. Long delays and struggles between ACOs could be eliminated by allowing the company more
control over which ACO has approval authority. Presently all our software product approvals are
delegated to one office but only after delays,
It seems that is a box checking and auditing activity that for ground systems would have to be modified
to ensure proactive-participation to minimize delays.
See the body of this letter. Use of DERs for full compliance findings both for STC and TSO projects
and/or facility/developer certification to self certify software to safety-driven levels would provide
significant benefit with no reduction in safety.
I am confused with the role, or lack thereof, of Designated Engineering Representatives (DERs) in the
certification efforts of Ground-based units. I understand they have jurisdiction in air-borne units. We
have to follow the same rules and guidelines as air-borne equipment manufacturers. We have a DER
under contract in an advisory role. We have experienced conflicts between the views expressed by our
auditors with those expressed by the DER. I would have suspected their views to have been more aligned.
It is only appropriate for a white box on a commercial aircraft.
When certification authorities are not able to provide guidance with respect to COTS. (Why is DOS or
Windows not acceptable for critical systems? what are the alternatives?, etc.) and tools qualification
(Why do we need the tools qualified to the same level as the SW?) It's never done in practice any way.
The use of tools enhances the safety/quality/reliability of the embedded software, but the cost and delay
of tool qualification are too high. The requirements on tools (of par. 12.2 of DO 17813) are at the same
level as the requirements for generated code. It should not be. Some low-level verifications and/or tests
should be suppressed, and a structural coverase analysis should be performed on the source code.
Getting feedback and responses of TSO deviations can take a long time, especially if they must be sent to
Washington.
The level of testing of the software product in some instances should be reduced to a higher level such as
functional testing. The added time to accomplish formal low level testing in some instances provides no
greater degree of safety/quality/reliability.
None.
[Our] development of [our product] and coordination with certification authorities dates back to 1991,
however, it was not until 1996 that a definitive requirement to demonstrate system safety to Level B was
understood. At this point the [our product' s] architecture was re-vamped to use 2 dissimilar processors
running 2 dissimilar operating systems. One of the two sides of the system would also have to have
software developed to Level B per DO-178B. All of these steps are necessary and are resulting in a
system that is easily verified to be safe. Ground based software systems had been certified previously
using other means. Knowledge and understanding of these requirements and processes sooner would
have been enormous help to [us]. For the future, a clear path through the certification process for
ground-based systems needs to be established. Allowance for evolving methods and practices also needs
to be addressed so that newer, better methodolol_ies can be incorporated to increase safety.
Review of the documentation by certification authorities often takes 60-90 days. (well in excess of the
published 30 day cycle. The Planning documents that we have submitted are not reviewed and approved
which seems like a waste of time.
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TableA6. Concluded
AsasafetyprofessionalwithtwoFAA programs running, I can see a basic problem with the safety
rationale used in starting the process. If this rationale could be fixed, a lot of the perceived problems with
this document could be eliminated. Taken at face value, the DO-178B process requires software to be
developed at a much higher level than intended. Developers wind up coming up with fixes or
simplifying assumptions to resolve the disconnect. This practice appears to be "cheating" and will
normally raise objections by safety professionals. The key issue is actually in the definitions used in
sections 2.1.1 and 2.2.1. When compared with MIL-STD-882, considered best practice in the
conventional system safety community, "failure condition" is actually a "hazard". "Failure condition" is a
poor choice of wording because it implies a failure, when in fact no failure need occur. Reliability is the
discipline where failures are the only cause considered. There is no doubt that this terminology has in
itself limited some safety analyses to only consider failures. To complicate things, failure condition
category is actually a hazard severity. Hazard severity is actually of little significance until combined
with probability. I can imagine an event that could cause massive damage to my system and personnel
(thermonuclear war), but rarely is it relevant because the probability of my system causing it is so small
as to be non credible. Yet in D)- 178B, the probability of software is never considered. Therefore
software contributing to an aircraft collision should be level A. The method chosen to overcome this
usually involves dropping the severity (failure condition category) down to a reasonable level. So
aircraft collision due to this cause is actually only a minor event. This is not only technically wrong, and
misleading, it also leads to bad decisions after the fact when software is maintained and not re analyzed.
"It is only a minor hazard so we can afford to lose the control." This thinking is incompatible with MIL-
STD-882 and will be very hard to explain in court, where we all wind up after the crash. The only valid
solution is to rewrite the front end to make it compatible with best practice, and assign "credit" in terms
of hazard likelihood reduction or probability for each level of software process. The unwillingness to do
that tells me that it is the consensus of the authors that this does not really mitigate hazards.
Our counterparts in the Aircraft Certification Office are involved in many projects with several other
applicants. Sometimes it takes months to get them to review and approve submitted material. I don't
believe this is the fault of the individuals, but the workload in the office. The quantity of avionics
systems has grown tremendously in the last few years and this is probably straining the FAA resources in
this area. Some suggested solutions might be to give more authority to the DERs, shift resources with in
the FAA (from other specialties), or increase the size of the FAA staff performing these functions.
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TableA7. ListalternativestoDO-178Bthatyouthinkcanbeused
withoutsacrificingsafety/reliability/quality.
Mil-Std-498wouldbeacceptable.CMMlevel2wouldprobablybeallright.CertainRADapproaches
wouldbeacceptable.Resultswithperformanceandrequirementstraceabilityarewhatweneed,thereare
manypathsthatwillproducewhatwewant.Weneedtobeopenmindedenoughtoacceptthereismore
thanone way.
None. I think DO-178B can be used efficiently with the comments listed above.
Risk Analysis - FAA order, Safety Assessments - FAA order
None that would also reduce software development or certification cost.
I believe the largest factor that would save us time without sacrificing safety/reliability/quality would be
to develop tools that would maintain a database of requirements to code to testing techniques. Of course,
the initial cash outlay to create or purchase such tools may be prohibitive. It would be an asset to be able
to modify, say, a Low Level Requirement in one place, and have the traceability to the High Level
Requirements, the System Requirements as well as to the code and test procedures be updated
automatically.
Classic System Safety Engineerins!
We don't know of any alternatives.
DO-178B provides sufficient guidelines to address many aspects of a given software life cycle process.
However, there needs to be ways to reduce the amount of paperwork for a given certification. The
concept of reusable code should lend itself to reusable documentation. As automated tools for
requirements, design, code and testing become more prevalent they will need to be addressed more fully
in DOI78B in such a way as to encourage the use of such tools. As for alternatives to the DO-178B, any
means that can be devised to show that the software product is safe, reliable and a quality product should
be considered.
Other software development standards exist, but as an industry consensus, the members of RTCA SC- 190
have stated that DO-178B is not broken and should stand. The issues with DO-178B are those of
interpretation and implementation of the processes and objectives that it calls out. Guidance, training,
and communication are the keys to improving the software certification process, particularly between the
ACO and the manufacturer.
On line templates pre-structured for document writinl_ and l_eneration.
Use of CASE tools to generate and test software has great potential to reduce the cost of certifying
software. There is a class of CASE tools which allow engineers to develop controls based on graphical
modeling techniques. These tools offer the following advantages: a) Reduce translation errors. The
typical software process has a system engineer specifying the system software requirements in a
requirements document. The software system engineer must then manually translate the system
requirements into software requirements. DO-178B does not detail the verification of this process. With
CASE tools and automatic code generation, the manual translation source of errors is eliminated, b)
Allow verification of system requirements and high level software requirements- The software life cycle
in DO-178B starts with the high level software requirements definition. There is no process currently
required to verify the system satisfies the operational needs and that the high level software requirements
meet the system requirements. These CASE tools allow a system to be modeled and executed so the
system requirements can be tested. The control portion of the model is the implementation of the high
software. This can also be executed with test cases to verify the high level software requirements It also
gives an environment to verify, c) Automatic code generation to reduce manual coding errors- These
tools allow source code to be generated directly from the tested control model. Since the automatic code
generation is a repeatable process, the verified control model can be automatically translated to source
code. This step eliminates the software design and software coding process and integration processes
(DO-178B sections 5.2, 5.3, and 5.4). While DO-178B does have a mechanism to qualify a software
development tool, there are many other areas of DO-178B that would have to be addressed, a) Section
5.3. software coding process and the related verification activities would be reduced or eliminated, b)
After tool qualification, would model diagram structural coverage be sufficient or would source (object)
structural coveraBe still be required?
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Appendix B
SSAC Workshop Attendees
Table B 1 contains the list of attendees at the SSAC Industry Workshop.
Table B 1. Workshop Attendees
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Appendix C
Issues with Mapping to Classification Scheme
Table C1 lists all of the issues recorded during the SSAC Industry Workshop. The ID number
represents the identification number of each comments in the workshop database. The last column in
the table maps each comment to the classification scheme given in Appendix D.
Table C1. Workshop Issues
ID
1
Comment/Issue I Mapped
1.1.1On particular project, FAA elevated criticality level at the last minute, despite the applicant
having an approved cert plan. This was not a one time event. Also, personnel changes within
FAA have resulted in changed requirements. Essentially, agreements made between applicants
and FAA are not always honored by the FAA. There is significant variation between regions,
also.
Lack of common understanding between applicants and FAA 1.1.1 &
1.2.1
FAA resources and abilities are not always adequate. This is particularly true for response time 1.1.2 &
from FAA. Even stated minimum response times are too long, and they are rarely met. (This 1.1.3
overlaps with another)
ACts responsible for software often can't use judgment, because they don't have enough 1.1.3
knowledge, so they rely on super-conservative approach to compliance. They hide behind a
checklist.
2.1.1Currently, complete plans are required for the derivatives, even if they are only barely different
from previous products. There is little value in producinl_ the plan for the derivative.
Differences between offices about what they want to see.
To what extent should accident statistics guide the allocation of resources in certification?
Perhaps too much concentration has been given to software.
8 Approvals take too lon8 to obtain. There is wasted effort in current approval process.
9 Having difficult time determining who in the FAA approves ground systems, and getting
different answers. Most common answer is to do the most expensive thing possible.
10 Supplier is held to higher level criticality requirements by the customer than by the FAA.
11 System engineerin[[ process is immature compared to the software engineering process.
12 Agreement between applicant and regulator as to what constitutes adequate level of partitioning.
13 FAA ACO engineers who speak English as a second language
14 Definition of independence varies, and sometimes independence is required when DO-178B does
not require it.
15 Independence required by ACt without sufficient justification
16 How much traceability is required, and how is it documented? (for example, is a matrix
required, or are other methods acceptable?)
17 structural coveral_e (_roup expects that SC-190 will handle this issue, but thinks its important)
18 In areas of interpretation difficulty, much time is spent in negotiating with regulators
19 Fear of failure to comply causes companies to take super-conservative approach to compliance.
20 Regulators buy time by asking irrelevant questions and requiring response from applicant, while
stopping all review activities until after they receive the response.
21 Serial approval process is required by some ACts: approval of TSO required before company
can bel_in STC process
22 Reciprocal agreements with other cert authorities are not workin8 as well as they did in the past.
23 Even after approval of PSAC, there are different interpretations about what additional documents
must be inspected by the FAA
24
25
Is compliance to DO-178B an issue?
Tests on target require a conformed unit when the production unit is identical
1.1.1
2.2.4
1.1.2
2.1.10
1.2.2
1.2.1
2.1.4
1.1.2
2.2.2
2.1.3
2.1.5
1.1.1
1.2.1
1.1.2
1.1.6
1.1.7
1.2.1
2.1.5
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26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
For lower levels of software, there are different interpretations about the extent to which testing
has to be done on the tar[et
Different interpretations of the applicability of coverage analysis techniques to different stages of
verification
Much confusion caused by the distinction between high and low level requirements
Inadequate emphasis on the software contribution to system hazards
COTS (SC-190 has subgroup lookin 8 at this issue)
Lack of prescription in DO17B of the packaging for the verification data permits ACts to
impose additional requirements on the format
!No requirements on test requirements for flight test software or for software for other types of
tests
Confusion about CCls and CC2s. Description in CM section is difficult to understand
Due to the costs involved with the publication of written (paper) documentation, can
consideration be given to "on-line" magnetic media, creation, update, and submittal of
documents. Options are available for standardized word processing, E-mail, web site
documentation. If the FAA would accept a media form of this material it would save time and
development cost, as well as submittal and review approval.
Lack of consistency between different offices about tool qualification. Interpretation of what it
means to be qualified differs widely. Interpretation of what tools must be qualified differs
widely
36 Lots of documents required to be _enerated by ACts
37 Traceability is an important technology for software development. What techniques are
acceptable to the FAA?
38 Individual ACt specialists impose requirements beyond that required by DOI78B
39 paragraph 9.4 is confusin 8
40 Lack of understanding at the beginning of a program result in large increased downstream costs.
This also occurs if a rapid prototyping model is invoked. (lack of predictability)
41 The definitions for (software/system and any other terms) safety, safety assessments, reliability,
quality, certification, costs, etc are not defined well enough to provide consistent review and
completion criteria. Nor is the relationship between them defined. If we don't have good
definitions we cannot know when we achieved them.
42
43
44
45
46
The definition of best practices should be codified into an extension of existing regulatory
guidance.
The regulatory requirements result in expensive reverse engineering costs as a result of
inadequate understandin_ of DO- 178B/ED- 12B
There is major misunderstanding of the intent behind the tool qualification requirements in DO-
178B/ED-12B. In many cases more stringent requirements are imposed than intended or the
requirements are misapplied to inappropriate items.
Upgrading between any software level is very expensive as currently required in DO-178B/ED-
12B without bein_ able to take credit for work already done.
The qualification of software tools is difficult to move between different certification projects.
There is no way to publish and take credit for certification of tools (e.g. MS visual c++, forth,
etc.) This implies that there should be a list of pre-qualified tools and other t),pos of software.
The reuse of certification data is extremely difficult.
Incremental development or any modem and innovative process is not supported in DO-
178B/ED- 12B.
47
48
49 Is there a way to reduce the extensive documentation requirements (e.g. more reliance on the
inteb, rity of the developers) and subsequent extensive regulatory review.
50 Is there a way to take more credit for service history and or non-developed software (e.g. COTS)
as a means of relief from some of the requirements in DO- 178B/ED- 12B.
51 DO-178B/ED-I 2B fails to provide clear direction on regression analysis resulting in inconsistent
application of the standard possibly causin£ unnecessary costs.
52 DO-178B/ED-12B requirements to show that a tool works but no requirement on the human
performance results in a bias a_:ainst the use of tools.
2.1.5
2.1.5
2.1.3
2.2.4
2.1.7
2.1.8
2.1.5
2.1.2
2.1.1
2.1.6
2.1.1
2.1.3
1.1.3
2.1.1
2.1.2
2.2.4
2.2.1
2.2.1
2.1.6
2.1.9
2.1.6
2.1.8
2.2.3
2.2.2
2.1.9
2.1.5
2.1.6
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TableCI. Continued
53 DO-178B/ED-12BwasdevelopedforlevelAbutdoesnotoffer sufficient relief for lower levels.
54 Imposition of regulatory requirements that do not provide Customer value/benefits
commensurate with the costs.
2.1.8
2.2.1
55 The requirements for structural coverage are onerous and result in unnecessary effort.
56 Explore the benefit of using risk based analysis similar to military and NASA programs.
57 _Extract only the important elements to concentrate on.
58 One of the major software development costs has been requirement changes resulting in rework
changes. DO-178B/ED-12B exacerbates this issue due to the stringent requirements for
documentation that may not be done otherwise.
59 A single source of calibration/education for the certification process needs to be identified so all
ACOs and developers know where to go/send people for the correct interpretation.
60 Certification authorities are generally (except for a few key individuals) incompetent in dealing
with safety of flight issues. This includes software.
61
62
63
64
65
Certification authorities seem to be largely ignorant of software issues (i.e. system engineers who
deal with software). ACOs tend to make excessive requirements/overly conservative to cover
inadequacy.
DO-178B/ED-12B and the system safety assessment process need to pay specific attention to
non-airborne systems.
2.1.5
2.2.4
2.2.1
1.2.3 &
2.2.2
1.1.1
1.1.3
1.1.3
2.1.10
1.1.7FAA allows JAA to dominate in joint airworthiness findings (intellectual domination)
FAA software specialists tend to know nothing about systems and safety issues. (There are some
exceptions). Knowledge of systems engineering and system management are apparently foreign
to this industry but applied in others.
1.1.3
FAA unwillingness to agree in writing to a comprehensive listing of remaining work to be done
to completion and a schedule. Incremental requirements that continue to change as the
certification progresses.
1.1.2
66 FAA unwillingness to allow DER final approval as defined and allowed by their own orders.
67 Government officials tend not to understand their professional responsibilities and liabilities.
i.1.4
1.1.3
1.1.368 Government people tend to be influence by politics. Special requirements are generated that
result in overkill
69 Level of rigor applied in granting DER authority varies widely and in fact this variability
undermines the system.
1.1.4
70 Prefer that FAA software specialist have had software development experience
71 Prefer that software DERs have had software development experience
72 Qualification for systems and software related work is not formalized in the same sense as other
engineering fields. (this not a certification authority (e.g. regulator),) specific issue)
73 Software safety assessment is not required/supported by DO-178B/ED-12B
74 The audit process is not well documented. There are different audit philosophies and they are
auditing for the wrong things. Q: How many safety defects are found by the audit process?
75 There is no grievance or appeal process
76 There is no primary education source for the certification process.
1.1.3
1.1.4
2.2.4
1.1.5
1.1.5
1.1.3 &
1.2.1
1.1.2
1.1.6
1.1.6
1.1.1
77
78
Excessive delays in Certification Authorities response to submission of applicants documents.
Tie in to DO-178B/ED-12B and the PMA (parts manufacturing authority) process has been a
problem.
79
80
Tie in to DO-178B/ED-12B and the TSOA (Technical Standard Order Authorization) process
has been a problem.
The same product and same processes taken to 2 different ACOs result in significantly different
costs (e.g. excessive) to get approval. Lack of mutually/universally understood definitions also
results in not knowing what to do based on definition differences between different documents.
This also relates to different interpretations between ACOs (e.g. different assignment of safety
levels).
81 Forcing the use of DO-178B/ED-12B on systems originally developed to DO-178A is intrusive
and expensive especially when there is extensive service experience. (There was some concern
that this implies that DO-178A and DO-178B/ED-12B provide equivalent levels of assurance.)
2.1.9
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82 Legacy systems for example back to DO-178A, 2167A etc. might provide real opportunities for
streamlining by trying to take credit for service experience and the fact that changes are
relatively small/incremental. This is more applicable for level B and C systems as opposed to
Level A systems.
83 Alternative methods are not up to date with current software development methods. A means to
easily/generically accommodate advances in technology without specifically including the
technology in the document. DO-178B/ED-12B forces the applicant to address the objectives
directly which may not be applicable for a 8iven technolos), or the base intent of the objective.
84 Customizing documents specifically for presentation to the FAA is very costly when the original
(e.g. redlined documents) is the basis for internal company approval and acceptance.
85 ACSEP (Aircraft Certification Suppliers Evaluation program) audit need better criteria for
production acceptance software.
86
87
88
89
9O
91
92
93
94
95
Documentation DO-178B/ED-12B does not address modem documentation tool systems. The
Certification Authority will require hard copy documents and not accept access to the automatic
document system. This is exacerbated by the 8110.3 requirements for approval of documents.
The Certification Authorities are requiring the wrong documents (e.g. propose use of software
safety analysis, or other appropriate documentation).
Some ACOs requires documents beyond the requirements of DO-178B/ED-12B.
The final documentation should be ultimately related to the safet_¢ requirements/assessment.
Design systems properly so that safety critical software is isolated from non-safety critical
software which limits the application of more stringent requirements to a much smaller
component.
Review the documentation requirements to ensure that they provide value added attributes for
both the regulator), authorities and the developers.
Delegation to the organization instead of on a product basis could contribute to reducing costs
considerably.
What is the percentage of overall cost due strictly to certification over and above what good
practices would dictate (e.g. cost of structural coverage documentation).
Caller 1 see no decrease
Caller 2 would see improvement in legacy systems in excess of 50%
Caller 3 Qualification of tools and non developed software (e.g. COTS) add about 90% increase
of tool qualification which translates into about 5%?? of overall certification.
Caller 4 FAA only contributes 10% of documentation costs probably less for overall costs.
Caller 5 Due to ability to use non developed software (e.g. COTS) a savings of 30% might be
realized. One example was OSI stacks $20k off the shelf vs %500K for uniquely developed.
Caller 6 Might see additional innovation using other types of development processes which
might provide productivity gains. (e.g. domain analysis, safety directed development, different
reuse techniques) The actual cost benefit is difficult to quantify.
Caller 7 If left to own devices might save 25-30%
Caller 8 Distributed application would be done in 1/4 to 1/5 the cost if DO-178B/ED-12B were
not applied.
Caller 9 The majority of the cost saved may not be due to DO-178B/ED-12B requirements but
may be due to the interaction with the certification authorities.
Caller 10 The release of the existing completion criteria (e.g. structural coverage) could result in
25% reduction in overall certification of software based systems.
Caller 11 On a given system dramatic amounts of money (50% or greater) by using alternate
means of compliance is bein_ realized
Would a uniform understanding of DO-178B/ED-12B within a given developers organization
produce a lower cost of development.
Caller 1 NO for a given company but true for all companies.
Caller 2 Yes within a large company
Caller 3 For the TSO system the driver is the certification authority drivin8 the non-uniformity,.
The testing/verification costs can run between 50-60% of the total cost of development. It is
unclear how much of this would go away without the requirements of DO-178B/ED-12B but is
obviously a _rreat driver.
2.1.9
2.2.3
2.1.1
1.1.5
2.1.1
2.2.4
2.1.8
2.2.4
2.1.4
2.2.1
1.2.1
2.1.5
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96 No way to evaluate that a company is capable of doing DO-178B/ED-12B prior to release of
contract resulting in retraining of suppliers delaying schedule and increasing costs. Even though
the contractor may be found capable by other measures (e.g. SEI CMM, ISO 9000, etc.)
97 DO-178B/ED-12B does not clearly define the difference between development and verification
tools and the requisite requirements.
98 DO-178B/ED-12B requirements applied to compiler issues results in extensive no value added.
During audit government position is you are guilty until proven innocent. Excessive demand for
proof of compliance. Much easier if documentation demands are clarified up front. A proof is
required (independent authority) that documents provided by manufacturers matches
requirements of standard.
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
III
ll2
113
114
115
116
117
Does Level A SW buy you more safety than level B, C, D? (Difference for level A: structural
coverage, independence, ). Does 178B add safety? (Lack of clearness on safety process and
interplay with SW process)
Is there a way to move from an absolute safety std to a relative std to evaluate safety? What is
level of safety now? (ex: GenAv aircraft with older equipment safer than newer equipment at a
lower safety level?)
Is there a need to submit data on very minor software changes? (Difference between TSO and
I TC/STC/ATC)
2.2.1
2.1.6
2.1.6
2.2.4
2.2.4
2.1.8
Is there any other alternative besides SDD that is allowed outside of DO-178B? Are there 2.2.3
alternatives to 178B that have been accepted? How would an alternate method be evaluated?
2.2.3Why do some ACOs not permit alternate means to DO-178B? (What if we could provide data
regardin_ alternate methods to show that they are more effective?) Redundant
What plans does FAA have to monitor and regulate consistency between ACOs in compliance
findings? And educatin$ their people to be consistent?
Is there consistency among ACOs? (already a definite answer: NO) Redundant.
Is 178B a good standard? (The best but is costly to manufacture/use)
Is there a consistent understanding to the DO-178B objectives? (No -- within and outside of the
FAA)
Is there info available from military applications regarding SW incidents?
Why is there a wide variance in sw approval between TC, STC, TSO? How can the processes be
made more similar? How can the playing field be leveled? (Inconsistencies between ACOs--
different ways of doing TSO among ACOs) (DERs used in some ACOs and not
others)(TC/STC/ATC Installations causing TSO pkg to be re-opened due to ACOs examination)
How is previously developed SW approved when transitioning from 178A to 178B? What kind
of credit can be taken from the 178A work. (Reference issue paper, CAST paper, SC-190 work)
When will FAA make formal attempt to harmonize with foreign a_encies? (1 cert vs. 28 certs?)
How is SW certified when used in conjunction with non-certified SW. (example: use of
previously developed SW--COTS operatin_ system).
Have we thought of an appeals process outside of the FAA that could be used to resolve SW
issues with the cert process? What is the appropriate way to deal with an ACO engineer who
will not provide certification approval, because he/she feels there is a SW problem that is
unacceptable? (What is the procedure to deal with an issue when the applicant and ACO do not
asree?)
When doing end-to-end, how do you look at avionics with respect to ground systems (ex: WAAS
and data/ink)? Answer: Bein_ handled by SC-190
Are there any possibilities of expanding DER authorities? (to allow quicker turn around). New
DER mgt process in work -- ODAR
How to avoid re-analysis when integrating TSO products as part of the TC, STC, ATC product?
(Appears that ACO approving TCs do not trust other ACOs approving TSO). Redundant
How much confidence should be placed on assessment of previously used tools for support of
developing software? (ex: qualified verification tools). Specify re-use of a previously qualified
tool--different for verification vs. development tool.
118 Why couldn't SEI maturity level be used an alternate means?
1.1.1
1.1.1
2.2.1
2.2.4
1.1.6
2.1.9
1.1.7
2.1.7
1.1.5
2.1.10
1.1.4
1.1.6
2.1.6
2.2.1
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119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
How does the FAA deal with changing technology? How do we keep the cert process up to date
with changing tochnology?
What is "good enough" testing? (Related to previous comment--testing req changes as
technology advances)
What is good enough requirements analysis? (Sys en_r issue). Missing element in 178B.
Lack of requirements validation?
2.2.3
2.2.2
Poor requirements is a cost driver. 1.2.3
Lack of emphasis in certification on an integrated systems view, seeing software as an integral 2.2.4
component
1.1.5Teaching SW cert requirements to affected people (at any level).
Level of people's understanding of good SW developin_ practice/DO-178B
Inappropriate methods levied by DERs/FAA/other cert authorities to meet 178B
Rote reliance by the reg agencies on a metric wit regard to value.
Waiting for FAA approval/lack of reliance on DERs
Continual change in interpretation of guidance
Excessively wide interpretation of what constitutes a safety requirement. Too many things are
treated as safety issues that are not safety issues.
Lack of industry experience or/and naivete within the regulators
A practice requiring 3 ACt reviews for SW, regardless of derivative cert effort or not.
Inappropriate level of experience in reg agencies due to lack pay. (high turnover). Retraining
ACt personnel every few years.
Continuous push on part of FAA to upgrade the SW criticality assessment, especially on
previously certified products.
Excessively wide interpretation of the term "with independence"
Minor requirements changes affect documentation and certification.
Pre-maturity (of documents, sys req, sw req, etc) is a cost driver. Also, pre-maturity of people.
(14 yr exp; 2.5 mill lines of code)
Excessively wide interpretation of the need for tool qualification. (i.e., tool qualification)
Interpretation of tool qualification need.
Conformity process. (First article conformity is costly; re-testing due to sw changes (HW quai,
etc); resression testing issues as sw changes;
Waiting for FAA approval. Slow response.
Maintaining traceability to code level
As tech changes, a standard can never be 100% correct.
Greatest cost driver is poor requirements.
Formal methods are a cost driver for foreign agency certification (CAA).
Static analysis and structural coverage are cost drivers, due to training, few tools available.
Lack of tool use data and industry experience available - no forum for it; no network for
information
There is some feeling that some methods may be helpful but there is no data available or may be
proprietary, i.e., formal methods. It may not have standardized metrics. They may require a
special stud),. Will there be uniform standards for both military and civil applications?
Can an industry-wide group exist to do data gathering on new topics? Issues include exposing
dirty linen, so data needs to be kept without company/person/system association. Using an
industry association between the FAA and the companies involved, such as AIA and GAMA,
will be necessary. This should include military data. Non-disclosure agreements may be
necessary. Independent studies may be necessary. The data to be collected needs to be defined,
including parameters, constraints, process definitions which generated the data.
Issues relating to compliance: reverse engineering required to comply to 178B, particularly for
existing systems.
variance between DERs/regulatory agencies on a given subject
1.2.1
1.1.3
1.1.3
1.1.1
1.1.3
1.1.1
1.1.3
2.1.9
1.2.3
1.2.1
2.1.5
1.1.2
2.2.2
2.2.3
1.2.3
2.2.2
2.1.6
1.2.2
2.1.9
1.1.1
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152 thereisnotechnicallycurrentandcorrectdefinitionforcompletenessforindependence,data
flowandcontrolflowcouplin_andMCDC
153 lowlevelofunderstandingofsafetyassessment/analysis/techniqueswit intheFAA;lackof
expertiseintheFAAofsoftwareandelectricalknowledge- thishasrequiredanexcessive
amountofdatatobedevelopedandreviewed;
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
2.1.5
1.1.3
lack of open communication between the FAA and the DER(s). 1.1.4
2.1.6Qualified tools on previous projects, used in the same way are required to be re-qualified.
Guidance on transition (exit) criteria needs to be better defined in DO-178B so it is not black-
and-white and allows for more flexibility. As a result, developers do not necessarily comply with
transition criteria they define.
Transition criteria forces developers to focus on process rather than products and does this focus
on process, versus product, effect safety.
Lack of good requirements definition impacts the cost of verification. Is the guidance in DO-
178B sufficient and consistent to help the developer?
Parallel, or shadow, processes. One to develop the product, the second to satisfy certification
objectives.
Same product, different customers causes a repetition of activities
Interpretation of compliance activities is different between applicant and certification authority
and how lon_ it takes issues to be resolved.
No credit l_iven for prototypin_ of requirements. (i.e., modeling before development)
Additional informal validation/verification activities used to decrease required DO-178B
verification activities renders formal review less effective. Are the additional activities
accomplished to achieve quality or to "patch" inadequate DO-178B _uidance?
164 Relative effectiveness of SQA and SCM representatives during all the activities and it is possible
to meet all SQA and SCM DO- 178B objectives without producinl_ a quality product.
165 Alternative methods scrutinized extensively or are rejected by ACt. As a result, more efficient
designs, activities, tools cannot be used for product development or significant re-engineering
needs to be done. DO-178B specifies that alternative methods can be used as long as the
objectives are met, but in practice it is not feasible.
166 Experience of developer in getting process credit is not taken into account. Competence of
developer is _iven no consideration when certifyin_ the product.
167 Turnover of certification authority personnel causes constant reiteration of nesotiatin _ process.
168 DO-178B does not allow for qualification of process once versus product each time.
169 Imperative to develop a set of [_uidelines to establish how COTS can and will be certified.
170 Cost of data generation is too high and ACts should be more receptive to using electronic
media.
171 No direct feedback mechanism for cost effectiveness path coverage analysis.
172 Need periodic, timely feedback from FAA on what is acceptable, and/or recommended practice.
173 DO-178B is a "what" and not a "how" standard, and experienced developers are able to
understand the level of effort required. However, DO-178B does not provide sufficient
information for the new applicant to scope their level of effort.
174 Consider that some of the tracking (e.g., Traceability Matrix and coverage analysis) should be a
function of size the job, develop environment, and the number of programmers as well as
criticality level.
175 It seems that the "data coupling" objective must be satisfied via test cases whereas analysis
should suffice to achieve the data couplin[ objective.
176 The difficulty of qualifying a production tool so that credit can be taken for its use. The tool
must now be created at the same level as the code it produces. This intuitively seems to be
overkill, but no alternative has been found that all (FAA & Industry) can agree to. Difficulty in
qualifying a production tool (e.g., code generator).
177 Approve and audit the manufacturer's software process rather than individual product submittals.
178 ACt availability does not coincide with submittals and can cause si[nificant delays.
179 Inconsistent interpretation by FAA certification authority may be a problem.
2.1.2
2.2.1
2.2.1
2.1.8
1.1.1
2.2.3
2.2.2
2.2.2
2.2.3
2.2.1
1.1.2
2.2.1
2.1.7
2.1.1
2.1.5
1.1.2
2.1.2
2.2.2
2.1.5
2.1.6
2.2.1
!.1.2
1.1.1
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180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
FAA software audits are inconsistent between reviewers. Reviews can be insightful, or not,
depending on the experience of the evaluators.
Lack of consistency between ACOs, DERs, and different regions.
FAA should accept DER's input and accepted without further review for areas that have been
delegated to the DER.
Interpretation of DO-178B may be a challenge for fast-track implementation and shouldn't a
sound development methodology should suffice?
Concern that different organizations in FAA may not be in a_reement.
What level of verification for COTS components is required (software and hardware)?
"Implied requirements" on either side can cause delay and DO-178B guidance should address
how implied requirements that affect safety should be addressed.
DERs ask for more that what is necessary which causes increased workload and implementation
of new processes.
Requirements for documentation, data, and verification testing are daunting. DO-178B and 130-
160D impose more stringent requirements for tests, processes and internal visibility
Certification process can be ad hoc, subjective and repetitive. There needs to be consistent
application, and expectations established up front.
Level of knowledge among ACOs is not uniform. Systems being proposed for implementation,
potential interactions with existing systems, effects of system changes on ATC environment, and
latest H/W & S/W design and testing methodolosies.
Maximum constraints imposed when in doubt. Developers over-produce to ensure passage.
There is a lack of central repository for availability of the checklist used by the FAA, issue
papers, policy letters. Etc.
Companies spend a Brcat amount of resources researching which tools to use.
What credit can a developer receive for using alternative means, architecture, and safety
monitoring versus what is commonly accepted (current TSO says apply for deviations). How
criticality is assign and flows to software is an issue.
Partitioning integrity, what types of techniques are acceptable and what are the criteria to accept
a partitioning strategy?
How can the applicant obtain credit for reuse of "shrink-wrapped" code for legacy systems
previously certified, for so called "derivative systems"
Reciprocal agreements with JAA arc not a common as they used to be.
Issue of "when" the life cycle data and qualification data are due, and when the FAA certification
authority approvals are due. For example, the PSAC is useless if not submitted or approved
earlier enough to be effective.
Issue of how to certify human-computer interface software to be compliant with DO-178B. As a
result, cost, schedule, and safety may be impacted. This may be difficult to get air and ground
community to agree.
Better use of DERs and get them involved earlier in the architecture design as opposed to current
practice or later in the process in a review role.
Current certification process may not adequately address today's hardware and software
architecture. In addition, obsolete parts cannot be replaced and companies cannot take advantage
of new technology
DO-178B does not provide adequate guidance for migrating legacy programs being used. A
legacy may not have done its certification to meet DO-178B objectives, but still may be a safe
system.
Right now the only difference between levels A and B is structural coverage. This is not safety
assurance. Hence what is the relative benefit of each of the objectives in terms of safety.
There is a lack of consistency in level of regression testing required, particularly in changes made
late in the program.
The objective of certifying software is safety. DO-178B does not specifically address safety.
Unless we assume all the safety areas are covered by systems and all software has to do is
replicate the system correctly. The end software product design needs to be checked for safety.
Some ACOs do not really accept a alternative means of compliance that deviate from DO-178B.
1.1.1
l.l.1
1.1.4
2.2.1
1.l.1
2.2.3
2.1.3
1.1.4
2.2.2
1.1.1
1.1.3
1.1.3
1.1.5
1.2.2
2.2.3
2.1.4
2.1.9
1.1.7
2.1.1
2.1.10
1.1.4
2.2.3
2.1.5
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207 DO-178B notes that high level test provides best indication of system performance, but then DO-
178B asks for increased structural coverage as the measure of level A. [Focusing on structures
tends to "pervert" the focus away from system performance oriented tests toward code structure
rather than requirements.
208 Objectives in Annex tables are not all objectives--some are specific means of compliance
MCDC), so an alternative means of compliance are not feasible as specified in Chapter 12.
209 The basis of DO-178B is quality-by-process. The goal of certification is safety of the public is
flight. Does process ri$or effectively address safety.
210 DO-178B is back loaded with most certification credit from testing. I'd have to say the building
safety into design is better than trying to test it in, but software designs do not have to be built or
reviewed for safety.
211 Records required for FAA audits can be excessive. ACOs interpretation of DO-178B varies so a
company rarely uses a sin$1e process, thus process become project or ACO specific.
212 Certification of multiple applications in modular software and hardware architectures. Including
mixtures of criticality and function, isolation of applications, system performance,
considerations, data fusion issues, etc. Fault protection and failure recovery mechanisms and
incremental certification of new applications. There is no guidance on how to certify systems that
incremental systems and systems that will run on multiple platforms will be handled.
213 Use of COTS software and operatin$ systems.
214 Applicability of airborne system certification standards to ground-based systems. Issues relating
to relative scale of systems, testin$, etc.
215 End-to-end certification of ground and airborne software. Need to protect and recover from
syntactical and logical errors. As a result, the scope of standards and guidance need to expand to
, cover the end-to-end system, including the communication pathways.
2.1.5
2.2.1
2.2.4
2.1.8
2.2.3
2.1.7
2.1.10
2.1.10
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Appendix D
Classification Scheme with List of Issues
All of the issues and comments recorded by the four groups during the workshop are assigned to
one or more categories in the classification scheme below. The number in front of each individual
comment is its identification number in the database of workshop issues. Issues identified in the
questionnaire responses that were not already in the database of workshop issues were included in the
classification scheme. The issues identified from the survey are designated as "from survey".
le Issues that are not specific to DO-178B
1,1 Issues within the FAA
1.1.1 Inconsistencies exist among ACOs in interpreting and following policy and guidance.
• 1 On particular project, FAA elevated criticality level at the last minute, despite the
applicant having an approved cert plan. This was not a one time event. Also, personnel
changes within FAA have resulted in changed requirements. Essentially, agreements made
between applicants and FAA are not always honored by the FAA. There is significant
variation between regions, also.
• 2 (see also 1.2.1 ) Lack of common understanding between applicants and FAA
• 6 Differences between offices about what they want to see.
• 14 (see also 2.1.5) Definition of independence varies, and sometimes independence is
required when DO-178B does not require it.
• 18 In areas of interpretation difficulty, much time is spent in negotiating with regulators
• 23 (see also 2.1.1) Even after approval of PSAC, there are different interpretations about
what additional documents must be inspected by the FAA
• 59 A single source of calibration/education for the certification process needs to be
identified so all ACOs and developers know where to go/send people for the correct
interpretation.
• 80 The same product and same processes taken to 2 different ACOs result in significantly
different costs (e.g. excessive) to get approval. Lack of mutually/universally understood
definitions also results in not knowing what to do based on definition differences between
different documents. This also relates to different interpretations between ACOs (e.g.
different assignment of safety levels).
• 104 What plans does FAA have to monitor and regulate consistency between ACOs in
compliance findings? And educating their people to be consistent?
• 105 Is there consistency among ACOs? (already a definite answer: NO) Redundant.
• 130 Continual change in interpretation of guidance
• 131 (see also 2.2.4) Excessively wide interpretation of what constitutes a safety
requirement. Too many things are treated as safety issues that are not safety issues.
• 133 A practice requiring 3 ACOs reviews for SW, regardless of derivative cert effort or not.
• 136 (see also 2.1.5) Excessively wide interpretation of the term "with independence"
• 139 (see also 2.1.6) Excessively wide interpretation of the need for tool qualification. (i.e.,
tool qualification) Interpretation of tool qualification needed.
• 151 variance between DERs/regulatory agencies on a given subject
• 161 Interpretation of compliance activities is different between applicant and certification
authority and how long it takes issues to be resolved.
• 179 Inconsistent interpretation by FAA certification authority may be a problem.
• 180 FAA software audits are inconsistent between reviewers. Reviews can be insightful, or
not, depending on the experience of the evaluators.
• 181 Lack of consistency between ACOs, DERs, and different regions.
• 184 Concern that different organizations in FAA may not be in agreement.
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1.1.2
1.1.3
• 189 Certification process can be ad hoc, subjective and repetitive. There needs to be
consistent application, and expectations established up front.
• (from survey) There are significant differences in the understanding of software and systems
design from ACO region to region. Not all ACOs are equal when it comes to rigor in
analysis and fairness in judgment. What is rejected in one region is acceptable in another.
ACOs do not provide quick, meaningful responses to applicants.
3 (see also 1.1.3) FAA resources and abilities are not always adequate. This is particularly
true for response time from FAA. Even stated minimum response times are too long, and
they are rarely met. (This overlaps with another)
• 8 Approvals take too long to obtain. There is wasted effort in current approval process.
• 13 FAA ACO engineers who speak English as a second language
• 20 Regulators buy time by asking irrelevant questions and requiring response from
applicant, while stopping all review activities until after they receive the response.
• 65 FAA unwillingness to agree in writing to a comprehensive listing of remaining work to
be done to completion and a schedule. Incremental requirements that continue to change as
the certification progresses
• 77 Excessive delays in Certification Authorities response to submission of applicants
documents.
• 129 (see also 1.1.4) Waiting for FAA approval/lack of reliance on DERs
• 141 Waiting for FAA approval. Slow response.
• 167 Turnover of certification authority personnel causes constant reiteration of negotiating
process.
• 172 Need periodic, timely feedback from FAA on what is acceptable, and/or recommended
practice
• 178 ACOs availability does not coincide with submittals and can cause significant delays.
• (from survey) There have been instances cited to me though I have not been party to them
where things were redone just to take credit for getting them done under the FAA reviewing
eye that added no value and caused delays/schedule problems.
(from survey) The implementation of PSAC by the FAA is ambiguous and from our
experience leads to years in delays.
Insufficient knowledge of software engineering and related disciplines exists within the
FAA.
4 ACOs responsible for software often can't use judgment, because they don't have enough
knowledge, so they rely on super-conservative approach to compliance. They hide behind a
checklist.
• 3 (see also 1.1.2) FAA resources and abilities are not always adequate. This is particularly
true for response time from FAA. Even stated minimum response times are too long, and
they are rarely met. (This overlaps with another)
• 38 Individual ACOs specialists impose requirements beyond that required by DO178B
• 60 Certification authorities are generally (except for a few key individuals) incompetent in
dealing with safety of flight issues. This is includes software.
• 61 Certification authorities seem to be largely ignorant of software issues (i.e. system
engineers who deal with software). ACOs tend to make excessive requirements/overly
conservative to cover inadequacy.
• 64 FAA software specialists tend to know nothing about systems and safety issues. (There
are some exceptions). Knowledge of systems engineering and system management are
apparently foreign to this industry but applied in others.
• 67 Government officials tend not to understand their professional responsibilities and
liabilities.
• 68 Government people tend to be influence by politics. Special requirements are generated
that result in overkill
• 70 Prefer that FAA software specialist have had software development experience
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1.1.4
1,1.5
• 72(seealso1.2.1)Qualificationforsystemsandsoftwarerelatedworkisnotformalizedin
thesamesenseasotherengineeringfields.(thisnotacertificationauthority(e.g.regulatory)
specificissue)
• 76(seealso1.2.1)Thereisnoprimaryeducationsourceforthecertificationprocess.
• 107(seealso1.2.1)IsthereaconsistentunderstandingtotheDO-178Bobjectives?(No--
withinandoutsideoftheFAA)
• 127InappropriatemethodsleviedbyDERs/FAA/otherc tauthoritiestomeet178B
• 128Rotereliancebytheregagenciesonametricw/oregardtovalue.
• 132Lackofindustryexperienceor/andnaivetewithintheregulators
• 134Inappropriatelevelofexperienceinregagenciesduetolackpay.(highturnover).
RetrainingACOspersonnelveryfewyears.
• 153lowlevelofunderstandingofsafetyassessment/analysis/techniqueswithintheFAA;
lackofexpertiseintheFAAofsoftwareandelectricalknowledge-thishasrequiredan
excessiveamountofdatatobedevelopedandreviewed;
• 190 Level of knowledge among ACOs is not uniform. Systems being proposed for
implementation, potential interactions with existing systems, effects of system changes on
ATC environment, and latest H/W & S/W design and testing methodologies.
191 Maximum constraints imposed when in doubt. Developers over-produce to ensure
passage.
Inadequacies, inconsistencies, and inefficiencies exist in the DER system.
66 FAA unwillingness to allow DER final approval as defined and allowed by their own
orders.
69 Level of rigor applied in granting DER authority varies widely and in fact this variability
undermines the system.
71 Prefer that software DERs have had software development experience
115 Are there any possibilities of expanding DER authorities? (to allow quicker turn
around). New DER mgt process in work - ODAR
129 (see also 1.1.2) Waiting for FAA approval/lack of reliance on DERs
154 lack of open communication between the FAA and the DER(s).
182 FAA should accept DER' s input and accepted without further review for areas that have
been delegated to the DER.
187 DERs ask for more that what is necessary which causes increased workload and
implementation of new processes.
200 Better use of DERs and get them involved earlier in the architecture design as opposed
to current practice or later in the process in a review role.
(from survey) We have had significant cost and schedule impact associated with compliance
finding in spite of having our own Software DERs. Significant improvement can be made in
this area.
• (from survey) I am confused with the role, or lack thereof, of Designated Engineering
Representatives (DERs) in the certification efforts of Ground-based units. I understand they
have jurisdiction in air-borne units. We have to follow the same rules and guidelines as
air-borne equipment manufacturers.
Insufficient information is available about the certification process.
74 The audit process is not well documented. There are different audit philosophies and
they are auditing for the wrong things. Q: How many safety defects are found by the audit
process?
• 75 There is no grievance or appeal process
• 85 ACSEP (Aircraft Certification Suppliers Evaluation program) audit need better criteria
for production acceptance software.
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1.2
1.1.6
1.1.7
1.2.1
• 113 Have we thought of an appeals process outside of the FAA that could be used to resolve
SW issues with the cert process? What is the appropriate way to deal with an ACOs
engineer who will not provide certification approval, because he/she feels there is a SW
problem that is unacceptable? (What is the procedure to deal with an issue when the
applicant and ACOs do not agree?)
125 Teaching SW cert requirements to affected people (at any level).
192 There is a lack of central repository for availability of the checklist used by the FAA,
issue papers, policy letters. Etc.
Problems exist within the TSO, TC, STC, ATC, and PMA processes.
21 Serial approval process is required by some ACOs" approval of TSO required before
company can begin STC process
78 Tie in to DO-178B/ED-12B and the PMA (parts manufacturing authority) process has
been a problem.
79 Tie in to DO-178B/ED-12B and the TSOA (Technical Standard Order Authorization)
process has been a problem.
109 Why is there a wide variance in sw approval between TC, STC, TSO? How can the
processes be made more similar? How can the playing field be leveled? (Inconsistencies
between ACOs--different ways of doing TSO among ACOs) (DERs used in some ACOs
and not others)(TC/STC/ATC Installations causing TSO pkg to be re-opened due to ACOs
examination)
• 116 How to avoid re-analysis when integrating TSO products as part of the TC, STC, ATC
product? (Appears that ACOs approving TCs do not trust other ACOs approving TSO).
Redundant
(from survey) Getting feedback and responses of TSO deviations can take a long time,
especially if they must be sent to Washington.
Working with non-U. S. certification authorities is difficult.
22 Reciprocal agreements with other cert authorities are not working as well as they did in
the past.
63 FAA allows JAA to dominate in joint airworthiness findings (intellectual domination)
111 When will FAA make formal attempt to harmonize with foreign agencies? (1 cert vs. 28
certs?)
• 145 (see also 2.2.3) Formal methods are a cost driver for foreign agency certification
(CAA).
• 197 Reciprocal agreements with JAA are not as common as they used to be.
• (from survey) We are currently preparing a package for the Joint Aviation Authority (JAA)
for an engine that was recently certified for the FAA. Preparation of additional
documentation for the JAA software certification will take about 200 hours. There are no
additional software tests or analysis in this effort, so the product will be identical. These
hours are strictly for creating reports. Better coordination of the certification authority
regulations would eliminate this unnecessary expense.
Issues within Industry
Insufficient knowledge of software engineering and related disciplines exists within
industry.
• 2 (see also 1.1.1) Lack of common understanding between applicants and FAA
• 11 System engineering process is immature compared to the software engineering process.
• 19 Fear of failure to comply causes companies to take super-conservative approach to
compliance.
• 24 Is compliance with DO-178B an issue7
• 72 (see also 1.1.3) Qualification for systems and software related work is not formalized in
the same sense as other engineering fields. (this not a certification authority (e.g. regulatory)
specific issue)
• 76 (see also 1.1.3) There is no primary education source for the certification process.
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o• 94 Would a uniform understanding of DO- 178B/ED- 12B within a given developers
organization produce a lower cost of development. Caller l NO for a given company but
true for all companies. Caller 2 Yes within a large company Caller 3 For the TSO system the
driver is the certification authority driving the non-uniformity.
• 107 (see also 1.1.3) Is there a consistent understanding to the DO-178B objectives? (No --
within and outside of the FAA)
• 126 Level of people's understanding of good SW developing practice/DO-178B
• 138 Pre-maturity (of documents, sys req, sw req, etc) is a cost driver. Also, pre-maturity of
people. (14 yr exp; 2.5 mill lines of code)
1.2.2 Lack of cooperation among companies increases costs.
• 10 Supplier is held to higher level criticality requirements by the customer than by the FAA.
• 148 (see also 2.2.3) There is some feeling that some methods may be helpful but there is no
data available or may be proprietary, i.e., formal methods. It may not have standardized
metrics. They may require a special study. Will there be uniform standards for both military
and civil applications?
• 149 Can an industry-wide group exist to do data gathering on new topics? Issues include
exposing dirty linen, so data needs to be kept without company/person/system association.
Using an industry association between the FAA and the companies involved, such as AIA
and GAMA, will be necessary. This should include military data. Non-disclosure
agreements may be necessary. Independent studies may be necessary. The data to be
collected needs to be defined, including parameters, constraints, process definitions which
generated the data.
• 193 Companies spend a great amount of resources researching which tools to use.
1.2.3 Requirements definition is difficult independent of certification.
• 58 (see also 2.2.2) One of the major software development costs has been requirement
changes resulting in rework changes. DO-178B/ED-12B exacerbates this issue due to the
stringent requirements for documentation that may not be done otherwise.
• 123 Poor requirements is a cost driver.
• 137 Minor requirements changes affect documentation and certification.
• 144 Greatest cost driver is poor requirements.
• 158 (see also 2.1.3) Lack of good requirements definition impacts the cost of verification. Is
the guidance in DO-178B sufficient and consistent to help the developer?
Issues specific to DO-178B
2.1 Issues about the adequacy of guidance in DO-178B
2.1.1 DO-178B has inadequate and ambiguous guidance for documentation.
• 5 Currently, complete plans are required for the derivatives, even if they are only barely
different from previous products. There is little value in producing the plan for the
derivative.
• 23 (see also 1.1.1 ) Even after approval of PSAC, there are different interpretations about
what additional documents must be inspected by the FAA
• 34 Due to the costs involved with the publication of written (paper) documentation, can
consideration be given to "on-line" magnetic media, creation, update, and submittal of
documents. Options are available for standardized word processing, E-mail, web site
documentation. If the FAA would accept a media form of this material it would save time
and development cost, as well as submittal and review approval.
• 36 Lots of documents required to be generated by ACOs
• 39 paragraph 9.4 is confusing
• 84 Customizing documents specifically for presentation to the FAA is very costly when the
original (e.g. redlined documents) is the basis for internal company approval and
acceptance.
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• 86 Documentation DO-178B/ED-12B does not address modern documentation tool systems.
The Certification Authority will require hard copy documents and not accept access to the
automatic document system. This is exacerbated by the 8110.3 requirements for approval of
documents.
• 170 Cost of data genera_, is too high and ACOs should be more receptive to using
electronic media.
• 198 Issue of "when" the liIc • . le data and qualification data are due, and when the FAA
certification authority approv,_,, are due. For example, the PSAC is useless if not submitted
or approved earlier enough to be effective.
• (from survey) Eliminate the redundancies inherent in the software verification documents.
• (from survey) We found too much emphasis on the conformance of the design and
requirements documents to the associated standards. We performed far too many iterations
addressing whether the documents were formatted correctly. The pertinent questions
regarding conformance to standards should be related solely to safety, not style.
• (from survey) We feel the requirements of section 11.10 concerning the documentation of
the Design Description are excessive, especially for very small projects, or software projects
where the development is based on a previously developed and documented software
platform.
2.1.2 DO-178B has inadequate and ambiguous guidance for planning and configuration
management.
• 33 Confusion about CCI s and CC2s Description in CM section is difficult to understand
• 40 Lack of understanding at the beginning of a program result in large increased
downstream costs. This also occurs if a rapid prototyping model is invoked. (lack of
predictability)
• 156 Guidance on transition (exit) criteria needs to be better defined in DO-178B so it is not
black-and-white and allows for more flexibility. As a result, developers do not necessarily
comply with transition criteria they define.
• 173 DO-178B is a "what" and not a "how" standard, and experienced developer are able to
understand the level of effort required. However, DO-178B does not provide sufficient
information for the new applicant to scope their level of effort.
• (from survey) There is some ambiguity when reading the text and associated tables, and
there is little guidance material. Many times we found ourselves wondering "What are they
getting at?"
• (from survey) The document itself could be modernized and written in a more "user-
friendly" manner. It should not take a DO-178 "experf' to implement; this reduces the
safety improvement impact due to diminished understanding and thus diminished
implementation of 178 processes and practices. It also adds to the amount of cost in dollars
and schedule to reach a clear understanding and implementation plan.
• (from survey) Better guidance to the interpretation and implementation of DO-178B is
strongly needed. A set of reference designs or industry best practice documents would be a
great tool towards this goal.
2.1.3 DO-178B has inadequate and ambiguous guidance for requirements definition and
analysis.
• 16 How much traceability is required, and how is it documented? (for example, is a matrix
required, or are other methods acceptable?)
• 28 Much confusion caused by the distinction between high and low level requirements
• 158 (see also 1.2.3) Lack of good requirements definition impacts the cost of verification. Is
the guidance in DO-178B sufficient and consistent to help the developer?
• 186 "Implied requirements" on either side can cause delay and DO-178B guidance should
address how implied requirements that affect safety should be addressed.
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2.1.4
2.1.5
2.1.6
DO-178B has inadequate and ambiguous guidance for partitioning.
12 Agreement between applicant and regulator as to what constitutes adequate level of
partitioning.
• 90 Design systems properly so that safety critical software is isolated from non-safety
critical software which limits the application of more stringent requirements to a much
smaller component.
195 Partitioning integrity, what types of techniques are acceptable and what are the criteria
to accept a partitioning strategy?
DO-178B has inadequate and ambiguous guidance for verification activities.
17 structural coverage (group expects that SC-190 will handle this issue, but thinks its
important)
14 (see also 1.1. I) Definition of independence varies, and sometimes independence is
required when DO-178B does not require it.
25 Tests on target require a conformed unit when the production unit is identical
26 For lower levels of software, there are different interpretations about the extent to which
testing has to be done on the target
27 Different interpretations of the applicability of coverage analysis techniques to different
stages of verification
32 No requirements on test requirements for flight test software or for software for other
types of tests
51 DO-178B/ED-12B fails to provide clear direction on regression analysis resulting in
inconsistent application of the standard possibly causing unnecessary costs.
55 The requirements for structural coverage are onerous and result in unnecessary effort.
136 (see also 1.1.1 ) Excessively wide interpretation of the term "with independence"
140 Conformity process. (First article conformity is costly; re-testing due to sw changes
(HW qual, etc); regression testing issues as sw changes
95 The testing/verification costs can run between 50-60% of the total cost of development.
It is unclear how much of this would go away without the requirements of DO-178B/ED-
12B but is obviously a great driver.
• 152 there is no technically current and correct definition for completeness for independence,
data flow and control flow coupling and MCDC
• 171 No direct feedback mechanism for cost effectiveness path coverage analysis.
• 175 It seems that the "data coupling" objective must be satisfied via test cases whereas
analysis should suffice to achieve this the data coupling objective
• 203 Right now the only difference between levels A and B is structural coverage. This is not
safety assurance. Hence what is the relative benefit of each of the objectives in terms of
safety.
• 204 There is a lack of consistency in level of regression testing required, particularly in
changes made late in the program.
• 207 DO-178B notes that high level test provides best indication of system performance, but
then DO-178B asks for increased structural coverage as the measure of level A. [Focusing
on structures tends to "pervert" the focus away from system performance oriented tests
toward code structure rather than requirements.
• 208 (see also 2.2.3) Objectives in Annex tables are not all objectives--some are specific
means of compliance MCDC), so an alternative means of compliance are not feasible as
specified in Chapter 12.
(from survey) DO-178B lacks emphasis on reliability testing; software reliability suffers
under DO-178B.
DO-178B has inadequate and ambiguous guidance for tool qualification.
35 Lack of consistency between different offices about tool qualification Interpretation of
what it means to be qualified differs widely Interpretation of what tools must be qualified
differs widely
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• 44There is major misunderstanding of the intent behind the tool qualification requirements
in DO-178B/ED-12B. In many cases more stringent requirements are imposed than intended
or the requirements are misapplied to inappropriate items.
• 46 The qualification of software tools is difficult to move between different certification
projects. There is no way to publish and take credit for certification of tools (e.g. MS visual
c++, forth, etc.) This implies that there should be a list of pre-qualified tools and other types
of software.
• 52 DO-178B/ED-12B requirements to show that a tool works hut no requirement on the
human performance results in a bias against the use of tools.
• 97 DO-178B/ED-12B does not clearly define the difference between development and
verification tools and the requisite requirements.
• 98 DO-178B/ED-12B requirements applied to compiler issues results in extensive no value
added. During audit government position Is you are guilty until proven innocent. Excessive
demand for proof of compliance. Much easier if documentation demands are clarified up
front. A proof is required (independent authority) that documents provided by
manufacturers matches requirements of standard.
• 117 How much confidence should be placed on assessment of previously used tools for
support of developing software7 (ex: qualified verification tools). Specify re-use of a
previously qualified tool--different for verification vs. development tool.
• 139 (see also 1.1.1) Excessively wide interpretation of the need for tool qualification. (i.e.,
tool qualification) Interpretation of tool qualification needed.
• 147 Lack of tool use data and industry experience available - no forum for it; no network
for information
• 155 Qualified tools on previous projects, used in the same way are required to be re-
qualified.
• 176 The difficulty of qualifying a production tool so that credit can be taken for its use. The
tool must now be created at the same level as the code it produces. This intuitively seems to
be overkill, hut no alternative has been found that all (FAA & Industry) can agree to.
Difficulty in qualifying a production tool (e.g., code generator).
2.1.7 DO-178B has inadequate and ambiguous guidance for COTS software.
• 30 COTS (SC-190 has subgroup looking at this issue)
• 112 How is SW certified when used in conjunction with non-certified SW. (example: use of
previously developed SW--COTS operating system).
• 169 Imperative to develop a set of guidelines to establish how COTS can and will be
certified.
• 213 Use of COTS software and operating systems.
2.1.8 DO-178B has inadequate and ambiguous guidance for reuse of certification data.
• 31 Lack of prescription in DO 17B of the packaging for the verification data permits ACOs
to impose additional requirements on the format
• 47 The reuse of certification data is extremely difficult.
• 53 DO-178B/ED-12B was developed for level A but does not offer sufficient relief for
lower levels.
• 88 Some ACOs requires documents beyond the requirements of DO-178B/ED-12B.
• 101 Is there a need to submit data on very minor software changes? (Difference between
TSO and TC/STC/ATC)
• 160 Same product, different customers causes a repetition of activities
• 211 Records required for FAA audits can be excessive. ACOs interpretation of DO-178B
varies so a company rarely uses a single process, thus process become project or ACOs
specific.
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2.2
• (from survey) When we have a problem report on that code, we must retest it in all the
products that use that software. This is required by section 11.3.h. We feel that we should
be able to reference the problem report and testing performed on the same software in
previously certified products without repeating this effort for each product that uses this
software module.
• (from survey) Qualifying, certifying routines or Sub-routines. So they can be used in
different applications providing the level is satisfactory
2.1.9 DO-178B has inadequate and ambiguous guidance for reuse of legacy systems.
• 45 Upgrading between any software level is very expensive as currently required in DO-
178B/ED-12B without being able to take credit for work already done.
• 50 Is there a way to take more credit for service history and or non-developed software (e.g.
COTS) as a means of relief from some of the requirements in DO- 178B/ED- 12B.
• 8 ! Forcing the use of DO- 178B/ED- 12B on systems originally developed to DO- 178A is
intrusive and expensive especially when there is extensive service experience. (There was
some concern that this implies that DO-178A and DO-178B/ED-12B provide equivalent
levels of assurance.)
• 82 Legacy systems for example back to Do-178A, 2167A etc. might provide real
opportunities for streamlining by trying to take credit for service experience and the fact that
changes are relatively small/incremental. This is more applicable for level B and C systems
as opposed to Level A systems.
• 110 How is previously developed SW approved when transitioning from 178A to 178B?
What kind of credit can be taken from the 178A work. (Reference issue paper, CAST paper,
SC-190 work)
• 135 Continuous push on part of FAA to upgrade the SW criticality assessment, especially
on previously certified products.
• 150 Issues relating to compliance: reverse engineering required to comply to 178B,
particularly for existing systems.
• 196 How can the applicant obtain credit for reuse of "shrink-wrapped" code for legacy
systems previously certified, for so called "derivative systems"
• 202 DO-178B does not provide adequate guidance for migrating legacy programs being
used. A legacy may not have done its certification to meet DO-178B objectives, but still
may be a safe system.
2.1.10 DO-178B has inadequate and ambiguous guidance for non-airborne systems.
• 9 Having difficult time determining who in the FAA approves ground systems, and getting
different answers. Most common answer is to do the most expensive thing possible.
• 62 DO-178B/ED-12B and the system safety assessment process need to pay specific
attention to non-airborne systems.
• 114 When doing end-to-end, how do you look at avionics with respect to ground systems
(ex: WAAS and datalink)? Answer: Being handled by SC-190
• 199 Issue of how to certify human-computer interface software to be compliant with DO-
178B. As a result, cost, schedule, and safety may be impacted. This may be difficult to get
air and ground community to agree.
• 214 Applicability of airborne system certification standards to ground-based systems. Issues
relating to relative scale of systems, testing, etc
• 215 End-to-end certification of ground and airborne software. Need to protect and recover
from syntactical and logical errors. As a result, the scope of standards and guidance need to
expand to cover the end-to-end system, including the communication pathways.
Issues about the benefits of DO-178B.
2.2.1 The extent to which DO-178B provides benefits beyond those that are provided by
other industry accepted practices is unclear.
• 42 The definition of best practices should be codified into an extension of existing
regulatory guidance.
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2.2.2
43 The regulatory requirements result in expensive reverse engineering costs as a result of
inadequate understanding of DO- 178B/ED- 12B
54 Imposition of regulatory requirements that do not provide Customer value/benefits
commensurate with the costs.
57 Extract only the important elements to concentrate on.
92 Delegation to the organization instead of on a product basis could contribute to reducing
costs considerably.
93 What is the percentage of overall cost due strictly to certification over and above what
good practices would dictate (e.g. cost of structural coverage documentation). Caller I see
no decrease Caller 2 would see improvement in legacy systems in excess of 50% Caller 3
Qualification of tools and non developed software (e.g. COTS) add about 90% increase of
tool qualification which translates into about 5%?? of overall certification. Caller 4 FAA
only contributes 10% of documentation costs probably less for overall costs. Caller 5 Due to
ability to use non developed software (e.g. COTS) a savings of 30% might be realized. One
example was OSI stacks $20k off the shelf vs %500K for uniquely developed. Caller 6
Might see additional innovation using other types of development processes which might
provide productivity gains. (e.g. domain analysis, safety directed development, different
reuse techniques) The actual cost benefit is difficult to quantify. Caller 7 If left to own
devices might save 25-30% Caller 8 Distributed application would be done in 1/4 to 1/5 the
cost if DO-178B/ED-12B were not applied. Caller 9 The majority of the cost saved may not
be due to DO-178B/ED-12B requirements but may be due to the interaction with the
certification authorities. Caller 10 The release of the existing completion criteria (e.g.
structural coverage) could result in 25% reduction in overall certification of software based
systems. Caller 11 On a given system dramatic amounts of money (50% or greater) by using
alternate means of compliance is being realized
96 No way to evaluate that a company is capable of doing DO- 178B/ED- 12B prior to
release of contract resulting in retraining of suppliers delaying schedule and increasing
costs. Even though the contractor may be found capable by other measures (e.g. SEI CMM,
ISO 9000, etc.)
106 Is 178B a good standard? (The best but is costly to manufacture/use)
118 Why couldn't SEI maturity level be used as an alternate means?
157 Transition criteria forces developers to focus on process rather than products and does
this focus on process, versus product, effect safety.
159 Parallel, or shadow, processes. One to develop the product, the second to satisfy
certification objectives.
166 Experience of developer in getting process credit is not taken into account. Competence
of developer is given no consideration when certifying the product.
168 DO- 178B does not allow for qualification of process once versus product each time.
177 Approve and audit the manufacturer's software process rather than individual product
submittals.
183 Interpretation of DO-178B may be a challenge for fast-track implementation and
shouldn't a sound development methodology should suffice?
209 The basis of DO-178B is quality-by-process. The goal of certification is safety of the
public is flight. Does process rigor effectively address safety.
The effectiveness of some specific activities required by DO-178B is unclear.
15 Independence required by ACOs without sufficient justification
49 Is there a way to reduce the extensive documentation requirements (e.g. more reliance on
the integrity of the developers) and subsequent extensive regulatory review.
58 (see also 1.2.3) One of the major software development costs has been requirement
changes resulting in rework changes. DO-178B/ED-12B exacerbates this issue due to the
stringent requirements for documentation that may not be done otherwise.
91 Review the documentation requirements to ensure that they provide value added
attributes for both the regulatory authorities and the developers.
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2.2.3
• 120 What is "good enough" testing? (Related to previous comment--testing req changes as
technology advances)
• 121 What is good enough requirements analysis? (Sys engr issue). Missing element in
178B.
• 122 Lack of requirements validation?
• 142 Maintaining traceability to code level
• 146 Static analysis and structural coverage are cost drivers, due to training, few tools
available.
• 163 Additional informal validation/verification activities used to decrease required DO-
178B verification activities renders formal review less effective. Are the additional activities
accomplished to achieve quality or to "patch" inadequate DO-178B guidance?
• 164 Relative effectiveness of SQA and SCM representatives during all the activities and it is
possible to meet all SQA and SCM DO-178B objectives without producing a quality
product.
• 174 Consider that some of the tracking (e.g., Traceability Matrix and coverage analysis)
should be a function of size the job, develop environment, and the number of programmers
as well as criticality level.
• 188 Requirements for documentation, data, and verification testing are daunting. DO-178B
and DO-160D impose more stringent requirements for tests, processes and internal visibility
• (from survey) It is not obvious to me that level "B" and level "A" requirements add the cost
equivalent of safety/quality to the product. This is particularly true of the independence
requirements.
• (from survey) I am unsure of the value of some of the code requirements such as having no
dead code or unused variables. I would maintain that unused variables are not detrimental if
it does not cause your processor to run out of memory to declare them. (The memory map is
checked for this condition). Likewise, if you can prove that code is truly unreachable, it
should also be deemed safe. These two restrictions affect our ability to have common
routines between different Configuration Items when only small differences in functionality
are apparent. In this case you must completely test two very-similar modules, which is
arguably redundant.
• (from survey) There is an inverse relationship and disproportionate amount of value added
by higher levels of structural analysis. Structural analysis adds significant cost and yields
marginal benefits.
• (from survey) We also feel that Level C should not require statement coverage. We feel
requirements based test coverage is sufficient for Level C software to provide an acceptable
level of safety/quality/reliability.
• (from survey) The use of tools enhances the safety/quality/reliability of the embedded
software, but the cost and delay of tool qualification are too high. The requirements on tools
(of par. 12.2 of DO 17813) are at the same level as the requirements for generated code. It
should not be. Some low-level verifications and/or tests should be suppressed, and a
structural coverage analysis should be performed on the source code.
DO-178B inadequately provides for innovation.
48 Incremental development or any modern and innovative process is not supported in DO-
178B/ED- 12B.
• 83 Alternative methods are not up to date with current software development methods. A
means to easily/generically accommodate advances in technology without specifically
including the technology in the document. DO-178B/ED-12B forces the applicant to address
the objectives directly which may not be applicable for a given technology or the base intent
of the objective.
• 102 Is there any other alternative besides SDD that is allowed outside of DO-178B? Are
there alternatives to 178B that have been accepted? How would an alternate method be
evaluated?
51
2.2.4
• 103 Why do some ACOs not permit alternate means to DO-178B? (What if we could
provide data regarding alternate methods to show that they are more effective?) Redundant
• 119 How does the FAA deal with changing technology? How do we keep the cert process
up to date with changing technology?
• 143 As tech changes, a standard can never be 100% correct.
• 145 (see also 1.1.7) Formal methods are a cost driver for foreign agency certification
(CAb).
• 148 (see also 1.2.2) There is some feeling that some methods may be helpful but there is no
data available or may be proprietary, i.e., formal methods. It may not have standardized
metrics. They may require a special study. Will there be uniform standards for both military
and civil applications?
• 162 No credit given for prototyping of requirements. (i.e., modeling before development)
• 165 Alternative methods scrutinized extensively or are rejected by ACOs. As a result, more
efficient designs, activities, tools cannot be used for product development or significant re-
engineering needs to be done. DO-178B specifies that alternative methods can be used as
long as the objectives are met, but in practice it is not feasible.
• 185 What level of verification for COTS components is required (software and hardware)?
• 194 What credit can a developer receive for using alternative means, architecture, and safety
monitoring versus what is commonly accepted (current TSO says apply for deviations).
How criticality is assign and flows to software is an issue.
• 201 Current certification process may not adequately address today's hardware and software
architecture. In addition, obsolete parts cannot be replaced and companies cannot take
advantage of new technology
• 206 Some ACOs do not really accept a alternative means of compliance that deviate from
DO- 178B.
• 208 (see also 2.1.5) Objectives in Annex tables are not all objectives--some are specific
means of compliance MCDC), so an alternative means of compliance are not feasible as
specified in Chapter 12.
• 212 Certification of multiple applications in modular software and hardware architectures.
Including mixtures of criticality and function, isolation of applications, system performance,
considerations, data fusion issues, etc. Fault protection and failure recovery mechanisms and
incremental certification of new applications. There is no guidance on how to certify
systems that incremental systems and systems that will run on multiple platforms will be
handled
• (from survey) There are 2 prime areas that are candidates for cost/schedule impact
reduction. The first is use of CASE tools to automatically generate certified software.
• (from survey) We don't allow our suppliers to use COTS unless it is previously certified
because it is our experience that the certification process as presently invoked by DO-178B
is too costly unless software is designed from the start with the meeting of DO-178B goals
as an objective.
DO-178B inadequately addresses the effect of software on the safety of the overall
system.
• 7 To what extent should accident statistics guide the allocation of resources in certification?
Perhaps too much concentration has been given to software.
• 29 Inadequate emphasis on the software contribution to system hazards
• 41 The definitions for (software/system and any other terms) safety, safety assessments,
reliability, quality, certification, costs, etc are not defined well enough to provide consistent
review and completion criteria. Nor is the relationship between them defined. If we don't
have good definitions we cannot know when we achieved them.
• 56 Explore the benefit of using risk based analysis similar to military and NASA programs.
• 73 Software safety assessment is not required/supported by DO-178B/ED-12B
• 87 The Certification Authorities are requiring the wrong documents (e.g. propose use of
software safety analysis, or other appropriate documentation).
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• 89 The final documentation should be ultimately related to the safety
requirements/assessment.
• 99 Does Level A SW buy you more safety than level B, C, D? (Difference for level A:
structural coverage, independence, ). Does 178B add safety? (Lack of clearness on safety
process and interplay with SW process)
• 100 Is there a way to move from an absolute safety std to a relative std to evaluate safety?
What is level of safety now? (ex: GenAv aircraft with older equipment safer than newer
equipment at a lower safety level?)
• 108 Is there info available from military applications regarding SW incidents?
• 124 Lack of emphasis in certification on an integrated systems view, seeing software as an
integral component
• 131 (see also 1.1.1 ) Excessively wide interpretation of what constitutes a safety
requirement. (Too many things are treated as safety issues that are not safety issues.
• 205 The objective of certifying software is safety. DO-178B does not specifically address
safety. Unless we assume all the safety areas are covered by systems and all software has to
do is replicate the system correctly. The end software product design needs to be check for
safety.
• 210 DO-178B is back loaded with most certification credit from testing. I'd have to say the
building safety into design is better than trying to test it in, but software designs do not have
to be built or reviewed for safety.
• (from survey) The key issue is actually in the definitions used in sections 2.1.1 and 2.2.1.
When compared with MIL-STD-882, considered best practice in the conventional system
safety community, "failure condition" is actually a "hazard". "Failure condition" is a poor
choice of wording because it implies a failure, when in fact no failure need occur.
Reliability is the discipline where failures are the only cause considered. There is no doubt
that this terminology has in itself limited some safety analyses to only consider failures.
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